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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this period of political uncertainty with citizens questioning the legitimacy of
political elites in both the developing and developed world, the relationship between
the mass public and their political representatives is of great importance. Yet there
remain questions about the conditions that bring about higher quality representative
government, particularly in developing democracies. This dissertation, a collection of
three essays under the title of Essays on Political Representation and Accountability in
Mexico, contributes to our understanding of how political and electoral institutions
influence the behaviors of representatives and most importantly their relationship
with their constituents. I focus on the case of Mexico, where the institutional feature
of the ban on reelection provides useful leverage for investigating the relationship
between constituents and representatives, with important insights for other develop-
ing democracies. In a series of three essays, I (1) investigate the electoral incentives
for term-limited representatives to be responsive to local issues in their district, (2),
evaluate the extent to which voters sanction their representative’s parties for the
votes they take in the legislature, and (3) explore the relationship between women’s
descriptive representation in the legislature and female political engagement.
In this introductory chapter, I situate the dissertation in the context of the evo-
lution of Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies, specifically the linkages that characterize
political representation in the chamber, in the post-revolution era. The three es-
says of the dissertation focus on the Chamber of Deputies specifically and legislative
bodies in general because it is these institutions that are meant to perform the pri-
mary function of representation in modern democracies. Moreover, the dynamics of
legislative representation also provide insights into the broader relationship between
1
government and the mass public in Mexico. This chapter also provides an overview
of the principal arguments and findings of the dissertation.
In the period immediately following the Revolution, the Mexican Congress was an
arena for the representation of regional interests. However, this decentralized legisla-
tive representation should not be mistaken for a grassroots politics based on direct
linkages between deputies and the mass public in their subnational constituencies.
Rather, the principal electoral connection operating in legislative politics was the
tie between local political machine bosses and their representatives in the Congress
(Scott 1964, Garrido 1982). These subnational political forces and their associated
legislative conflicts, not to mention their potential for fomenting armed conflict, led
to reforms of the political structure of Mexico’s legislative institutions (national and
subnational). Along with the founding of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR,
the predecessor to the PRI), another centralizing reform was the abolition of consecu-
tive reelection of legislative posts in 1933. The aim (and effect) of this reform was for
the party leadership to centralize control of the PNR and to move legislators’ loyalties
toward the national party leadership and away from local caudillos (Weldon 2004).
One of the pillars underpinning the single-party regime was the corporatist system,
which integrated the mass public into sectoral organizations (labor unions, peasants,
and popular associations) dependent and subordinate to the state. Under the cor-
poratist arrangement, rank-and-file members received access to public services and
benefits, sectoral leaders enforced restrictions on demand-making and mobilized the
membership for electoral purposes. In return, sectoral leaders received guarantees
relating to policy benefits for their groups and political representation via govern-
ment posts (Collier and Collier 1991). This push toward the integration of mass
organizations into the party (and state) structure under the Ca´rdenas government
(1934-1940) was principally a means of establishing political control by the state over
mass organizations rather than a mechanism of interest representation in government
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(Bensusa´n and Middlebrook 2012, 336-338). The composition of the Chamber of
Deputies changed from one organized along federal representation to sectoral rep-
resentation (Godoy 2014). Along with the creation and formal recognition of the
sectors, the candidate selection methods of the PRI in this period were reformed to
replace primaries with sectoral quotas (Medina Pen˜a 1993, 151).
The democratization movement in Mexico was consequential in multiple ways for
the relationship between the governed and their government. First, it entailed the
development of meaningful electoral competition and the end of one-party rule. Sec-
ond, the corporatist system that served as the conduit between the mass public and
legislative representation was supplanted by the emergence of representation linkages
based in party politics. The decade following the defeat of the PRI in a presiden-
tial election in 2000 demonstrated the potential emergence of a stable party system
marked by clear programmatic differentiation. This was typified most clearly in the
2006 presidential election where the contest was between the main parties of the left
and right, with the more ideologically amorphous PRI sidelined to third.
The development of stable party-voter linkages could have been a major boost
to the quality of democracy in Mexico. The empirical study of representation in
comparative politics has placed great emphasis on the responsible party model as
the normative standard (Dalton 1985; Kitschelt 2000; Luna and Zechmeister 2005).
Under this model, high quality representation entails that parties are accountable to
voters by committing to programmatic appeals. Therefore, cohesive legislative parties
are key for accountability (Carey 2009). This ingredient is certainly present in the
Mexican context, where there is high party discipline in legislative voting (Nacif 2002)
and there are ideological cleavages that define those legislative blocs. At the same
time, there was also a nascent programmatic component to the voting behavior of
the mass public in the decade following the 2000 election. In 2006, perredista voters,
on average, placed themselves on the left, priistas placed themselves to the right of
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this group, and panistas were the more right-wing group (Moreno 2012, 588).
Despite these developments at the outset of electoral democracy in the country,
the linkages between voters and parties have deteriorated sharply in the previous
decade. The share of self-identified partisans in the mass public has declined. This
has been paired with declining trust in political parties (Romero et al. 2018, 22-
25). Moreover, diverging from the relative stability in the 2000s, the party system
has fragmented considerably (Freidenberg and Aparicio 2016). The weakening of the
party system has culminated in the ascension of Morena, a personalist party built
around the linkage between Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez Obrador and the mass public, as
the dominant partisan force in Congress. The decline of Mexico’s stable party system
mirrors dynamics throughout the world’s developing democracies (Mainwaring and
Zucco 2007). These recent trends cast doubt on the ability of a party-based model of
political representation and accountability.
These developments provide the context for the three essays of the dissertation.
With the deterioration of partisanship and party system fragmentation, can linkages
independent of party politics mediate the relationship between representatives and
the mass public? Chapter 2 provides insight on the relationship between legislators’
career ambitions and responsiveness to constituents in their districts. This is in the
context of high party discipline in the chamber but a resurgence of the importance
of local electoral politics for legislators’ careers. Are voters able to hold parties ac-
countable for the roll call votes of their deputies? Chapter 3 suggests that voters are
up to the task of engaging in retrospective punishment and reward, and that party
branding or issue ownership plays an important role in this process. Finally, Chapter
4 explores an increasingly important and traditionally neglected aspect of legisla-
tive representation: the extent to which legislatures mirror the citizens they serve.
Specifically, it argues that parties are highly influential in how the process toward
greater representation of women in the chamber unfolds. Although each chapter is a
4
self-contained essay, they all address critical questions in Mexico’s evolving democ-
racy and in doing so provide insight for understanding political representation and
accountability in other developing democracies. The rest of this brief introduction
outlines the main arguments, methods, and conclusions of the three essays.
1.1 Summary of Chapters
Chapter 2: “Progressive Ambition and Representation: The Case of Mexico”
Can legislators be responsive without reelection? While the reelection incentive
is the basis of standard accounts of responsiveness, less is known about the electoral
connection between representatives and their districts in contexts where legislators
do not necessarily seek reelection or are limited from doing so. I approach this ques-
tion from the perspective of progressive ambition, whereby legislators’ responsiveness
is motivated by the desire to move on to other political posts. I argue that such
ambitions can be activated by factors that structure political opportunities. Using
the case of Mexico, I show how federalism and the staggered nature of the federal,
state, and municipal electoral calendars affect legislators’ career opportunities and
consequently the extent to which they represent their district’s local interests. I also
test and find evidence for support of a mechanism for an electoral connection based
on building personal reputation rather than party discipline.
Chapter 3: “Legislative Voting and Electoral Accountability: The Case of Mexico’s
VAT Reform”
The ability of voters to punish representatives for policies associated with nega-
tive material outcomes is a cornerstone of democratic accountability. A legislator’s
position-taking in roll call votes is central to the work of a representative. Are legis-
lators and their parties held accountable for the consequences of unpopular roll calls?
What conditions facilitate electoral sanction and reward by voters? I address these
questions by examining both the collective (or partisan) and individual accountabil-
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ity mechanisms. I use the case of Mexico’s VAT reform in 2013, where legislators’
votes can be tied to negative effects for those bearing the costs of reform. I find that
voters affected by a VAT hike punish their incumbent parties. However, this effect
is conditional on the position-taking of members of congress. Additionally, parties
that offer clear alternatives to the negative consequences of reform can increase the
electoral gains from voters’ retrospection. These findings have important implications
for understanding the dynamics of when both collective and individual accountability
operate.
Chapter 4: “Female Officeholders and Women’s Political Engagement: The Role of
Parties”
The ability of women in office to inspire other women to enter politics can be an
important process in undoing longstanding gender gaps in political representation.
Previous research on this potential role model effect of female officeholders finds mixed
results in terms of female candidacies across a wide range of contexts. Explanations
for these mixed findings include that positive effects are conditional on the nature of
women’s incorporation in a given context, and also suggest female incumbents can
lower the perceived need/utility of more women running. I take a wider view and
test for role model effects across different levels of the candidate emergence process.
In doing so, I put a spotlight on a potentially pivotal variable: the role of parties
and their candidate selection processes in moderating role model effects. Through
a case study of Mexico, I find evidence of engagement effects among women in the
mass public as well as women seeking party nominations, but no evidence for role
model effects at the candidate-level (either within or across districts) in congressional
elections. Using data on the candidate nomination processes of the PAN, I find
evidence that party decisions in candidate selection methods attenuate possible role
model effects.
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Chapter 2
Progressive Ambition and Representation: The Case of Mexico
2.1 Introduction
Does the lack of reelection entail the absence of representatives’ responsiveness to their
constituents? Critics of term limits have argued that such rules sever the link be-
tween representative and district by removing the reelection incentive (Cleary 2010).
The desire to maintain office forms the basis of traditional explanations for legisla-
tors’ behaviors as representatives for their district (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978). This
perspective does not bode well for the quality of representation in the world’s democ-
racies where reelection is infrequent or institutionally limited. However, a growing
literature has demonstrated that “progressive ambition” - the aspiration to attain
future posts - can motivate legislators to be responsive to their district. Previous
work provides some evidence that legislators who go on to pursue subnational posts
are more likely to engage in behaviors such as pork barreling and bill submissions
that target their future constituencies (Micozzi 2014a, Kerevel 2015). Yet, this work
is limited theoretically, in not incorporating the role of political and electoral con-
texts in systematically influencing the behavioral consequences of career ambitions,
as well as empirically, in its ability to make causal inferences about the relationship
between career ambitions and political action. Extending prior research, I argue that
the structure of electoral opportunities can activate the progressive career ambitions
of legislators, leading legislators to increase their degree of responsiveness to their
districts in order to build local electoral support, even in the absence of reelection.
I test this argument using the case of Mexico, where federal deputies are constitu-
tionally barred from pursuing reelection after their term in office. This institutional
arrangement means that every legislator must look to other offices, particularly at
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the subnational level, if they aim to continue building a political career beyond their
three-year term in the legislature. Therefore, combined with the federal structure of
the Mexican political system, I can assume that legislators are progressively ambitious
and subnational posts are valued components of political careers. Per my thesis, these
career ambitions are activated by the local electoral opportunity structure, specifically
whether a deputy faces the prospect of coming local elections. The staggered nature
of federal and local elections means that deputies from different states face distinct
electoral opportunities at different points in their legislative term. Thus, the electoral
calendar provides exogenous variation in the electoral opportunities and therefore the
activation of progressive ambitions. I argue that the presence of an upcoming local
election ought to positively predict deputies’ level of responsiveness to the interests
of their constituents. In order to measure responsiveness to the district, I make use
of an original data collection of the frequency of legislators’ bills that pertain to local
interests in the 62nd Legislature (2012-2015) of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies.
The core finding is that deputies from states with upcoming local elections, com-
pared to those from states without approaching local elections, submit more district-
targeted bills in the legislative year leading up to those elections. Moreover, through
an analysis of legislators’ party discipline measured using roll call votes, I find that
deputies are less likely to vote along the party line in the year leading up to local
elections. This evidence suggests that the electoral connection between progressively
ambitious representatives and constituents is driven by efforts to build their personal
reputation rather than serve their party’s electoral prospects. Taken together, these
results demonstrate that even in the absence of reelection, representatives can still
be responsive to their constituents when career ambitions and electoral opportunities
combine to incentivize district-oriented political behaviors.
In the remainder of the paper, I review research on political ambition and re-
sponsiveness of legislators to constituents. I then develop a hypothesis regarding the
8
relationship between electoral incentives and responsiveness in conditions where leg-
islators will not seek reelection. Along with this main hypothesis, I also develop a test
derived from the empirical implications of competing explanations for the mechanism
motivating responsiveness: party discipline or personal vote. Finally, I discuss the
data and methodology of the empirical analyses and present the results.
2.2 Political Ambition and Responsiveness
The structure of electoral incentives has long been held as the starting point for
understanding the behavior of legislators. This is particularly the case for the issue of
representation and the linkage between representatives and voters in the district. In
U.S. politics, the desire for reelection amongst members of Congress drives them to
engage in activities such as credit claiming, pork barreling, and maintaining contact
with constituents that will enhance their electoral prospects in the district (Mayhew
1974, Fenno 1978). In this model of representation, elections are meant to serve as
the time to hold representatives accountable for their behavior and performance while
in office. Forward-looking and ambitious politicians will work to cultivate support in
their districts to fight off potential challengers.
While this assumption of reelection goals has been the starting point for valu-
able insights in American politics, it is not an appropriate assumption in many other
contexts. In developing a typology of political ambition, Schlesinger (1966, 10) differ-
entiates “static ambition,” where “the politician seeks to make a long-run career out
of a particular office,” with “progressive ambition,” where “the politician aspires to
attain an office more important than the one he now seeks or is holding.” Compar-
ative analyses of legislative behavior have found that the static ambition assumption
has widely varying degrees of applicability to the career paths of legislators across the
world (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002, Matland and Studlar 2004). Rather than static
ambition, many politicians in the world’s democracies go on to seek other posts. For
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example, around 83% of members of the lower house in the United States returned to
office after their term (in 1996). In the same period, only 17% and 43% of legislators
in Argentina and Brazil returned to office, respectively.1 Samuels (2003) builds on
Schlesinger’s typology by expanding the definition of progressive ambition to incorpo-
rate a world where politicians move up and down the levels of government throughout
their political careers, which characterizes the aforementioned cases of Argentina and
Brazil. Rather than a strict hierarchy from local to national posts, sitting federal
legislators may value and desire subnational offices as part of their long-term career
goals.
Working from the progressive ambition framework, the lack of reelection does not
necessarily entail a disconnect between representative and constituents, as the static
ambition perspective would predict. Legislators who are progressively ambitious and
aspire to attain a subnational post may be responsive to the constituents, not because
they wish to secure reelection, but instead because they desire to build a base of
support for election to their next post. In order to study the relationship between
progressive ambition and responsiveness to the district it is necessary to identify
legislators who are progressively ambitious. This is difficult in contexts such as Brazil
and Argentina where it cannot be known beforehand whether legislators will try
to keep their seat or pursue subnational posts, since they have the option of both.
For this reason, I focus on the case of Mexico, which presents a useful case in that
progressive ambition is forced upon politicians via the constitutional ban on reelection.
This ban on direct reelection means that each office holder must look elsewhere if she
wishes to continue her political career once the term is over. While cases with explicit
term limits (such as Mexico) permit a clean test of the influence of the electoral
opportunity structure on progressive ambition, findings from such analyses permit
inferences about behavior in other democracies where rates of reelection are low and
1Data is from p. 416 Table 14.1 of Morgenstern 2002.
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politicians have both static and progressive career options.
The institution of no reelection within Mexican politics is argued to have signifi-
cant implications for representation. The conventional wisdom on Mexican democracy
is that limits on reelection have been detrimental to the development of governments
and politicians that are responsive to their voters. From a practical point of view,
the inability to stay in office past the three-year term (or six-year term for senators)
limits the ability of deputies to invest in and develop the necessary resources and skills
to act as effective legislators (Ugalde 2000). The ban on consecutive reelection has
also been a source of leverage for political party leaders since they traditionally have
control of nominating procedures for elected office. In order to gain elected office,
politicians must first secure the nomination of their party and it is here that party
leaders can exercise influence in their role as gatekeepers to elected office. This, along
with party control of campaign resources, produces politicians who serve as agents
to party leaders when formulating and voting on policy (Be´jar Algazi and Waldman
2004, Langston 2007). In theory, this pattern holds little room for any influence from
the district on legislator behavior. A more basic concern over the consequences of
the ban on reelection is the argument that it severs the link between voters and their
particular representative. Without the prospect of being able to hold onto their job
for the next term (as well as the looming referendum on their performance it en-
tails), politicians are unlikely to engage in activities that serve their electorate when
reelection is simply not part of their career. The implication is that elections fail
in their role as mechanisms of accountability and representation. In his book length
examination of the (non-)role of elections in local government performance as a result
of term limits, Matthew Cleary goes so far as to state, “the conclusion is inescapable:
electoral competition does not make Mexican municipal governments more responsive
to the interests of the citizens (2010, 188).”
As stated above, comparative scholars have recognized that reelection-based ac-
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counts of representative behavior may not follow the career paths and behaviors of
legislators in democracies outside the United States. While one conclusion from this
may be that the ability of elections to motivate representation and accountability
from elites is eliminated (as in the common portrayal of the Mexican case above),
another interpretation is that a different model of career ambition and elite behavior
is needed to explain a markedly different political context. Working from this second
tack, scholars have increasingly looked to progressive ambition as an alternative mo-
tivation for legislators’ behavior in office. From this perspective, rather than aspiring
to hold onto their legislative seat for the foreseeable future of their career, legislators
aspire to move on to another (often subnational) post once their current mandate is
over.
This perspective of career ambition has been especially applicable to federal
regimes with low rates of reelection. In Brazil, Samuels (2003) argues that fed-
eral legislators have low rates of reelection because their political careers are more
focused on attaining positions at the local level, either through mayorships or gov-
ernorships. Rather than long careers in the national legislature, Brazilian deputies’
stints in office serve as opportunities to deliver pork to local interests and therefore
build up their base of support at the local level. In Argentina, federal legislators
who ultimately go on to run for municipal or provincial offices tailor their behavior
while in the national legislature in anticipation for these future career moves. Com-
pared to Argentine legislators who do not go on to run for local office, deputies with
subnational ambitions draft more bills that target localities (Micozzi 2014a) and are
more likely to engage in legislative cooperation (in the form of cosponsoring bills)
with other aspiring subnational executives to signal the strength of their impending
candidacy (Micozzi 2014b). Similarly in Mexico, Kerevel (2015) finds that legislators
elected through single-member districts (SMDs) who intend to pursue local office in
the future submit more budget amendments targeted to their constituency (as a form
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of pork-barreling). Even in a country like Uruguay, where the party and electoral
system are thought to diminish incentives for the development of personal reputa-
tions, legislators who go on to run for departmental executive office submit more bills
targeting their districts (Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014).
While these studies have contributed significantly in developing our theoretical
and empirical understanding of viable alternatives to the static ambition model, there
remain significant limitations to current research on the topic. The work cited above
has established a link between legislators’ future career choices and their behavior
in office. Yet, why do some legislators develop progressive career ambitions and
therefore work to cultivate local electoral support in the first place? This paper
makes a theoretical contribution in the study of progressive ambition by building on
the link between career choices and legislative behavior to include the role of the
local electoral context. Rather than taking a politician’s desire for subnational office
as the starting point, I examine the causal effect of local electoral opportunities in
activating the link between career ambition and district-oriented legislative behavior.
If the basic assumption of progressive ambition theory, that politicians focus their
efforts in working to secure their next (often subnational) post, is correct, then these
politicians should be particularly sensitive to the local electoral context. I argue that
the local electoral opportunity structure influences the responsiveness of progressively
ambitious politicians to the interests of their district. This argument leads to the
following hypothesis about electoral incentives and responsiveness.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of local electoral opportunities motivates term-
limited legislators to be responsive to the concerns of constituents.
There is also the question of the mechanism driving the behavior for this hypoth-
esized relationship between electoral incentives and responsiveness. In the discussion
above, the focus has been on the individual politician and her incentives to cultivate
a personal reputation with the electorate through attention to local issues. The lit-
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erature on representation has placed great attention on the ways in which politicians
can benefit electorally by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their
party (Fenno 1978, Cain et al. 1987, Carey and Shugart 1995). An alternative expla-
nation for the relationship between elections and responsiveness is one based on the
central role of parties. Rather than individual electoral motivations, the party and
its membership, who wish to someday gain seats currently held by the party, deter
shirking by officeholders. In this situation, incumbents act in the interest of their
constituencies to improve the electoral prospects of the party-at-large (Alesina and
Spear 1988). In his examination of term-limited Costa Rican legislators, Carey (1998)
argues that behaviors such as bringing pork to the district are motivated by a desire
to gain favor with the party leadership and future national executives. This, in turn,
is expected to improve the electoral performance of the party in future elections.
A challenge for the research on progressive ambition (and for the study of political
representation in general) is disentangling these different mechanisms that can both
bring about legislative responsiveness. To distinguish between these theoretically dis-
tinct explanations, I examine the party discipline behavior of legislators. The central
hypothesis of this paper is that local electoral opportunities motivate responsiveness
from term-limited representatives. If this relationship is driven by loyal partisans
working to improve the electoral prospects of their party, then one would expect that
measures of a legislator’s party discipline should also follow a similar pattern with
respect to electoral opportunities. However, to the extent that party discipline is
unrelated to or negatively associated with local electoral opportunities, then respon-
siveness is likely driven by incentives to build a personal reputation with constituents.
Deputies who are working to cultivate their personal electoral base are unlikely to
vote along the party line and in fact may be more inclined to defect if such a position
is personally electorally advantageous (Carey 2009, Tavits 2009). This discussion
suggests a hypothesis that can be tested with data from the Mexican case.
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Hypothesis 2: [If deputies’ responsiveness is motivated by efforts to aid their
personal reputation rather than their party’s electoral prospects], their likeli-
hood of voting with the party line will be negatively associated with the presence
of local electoral opportunities.
In addition to the theoretical contribution of this paper, there are also important
empirical limitations to the current research on progressive ambition. Specifically,
the way the independent variable of interest, career ambition, is commonly opera-
tionalized is problematic for causal identification. The standard practice is to code
progressively ambitious representatives based on their next career moves. This gen-
erally means a legislator with progressive ambitions is one who ran for a subnational
office during or immediately following their legislative mandate. This is a fairly in-
tuitive coding scheme and it is also a practical choice. How is it possible to know
what the personal ambitions of a legislator are unless they reveal those ambitions
through their career moves? However, this scheme encounters two problems. First,
from a measurement perspective, simply looking at candidacies surely does not reflect
all legislators who maintained ambitions for subnational posts while in their legisla-
tive seat. Before candidacies, there are party primaries or nomination methods, and
before that, ambitious legislators may ultimately forgo a subnational run altogether
once other factors (such as anticipating a strong opponent) come into play. These
legislators who ultimately are not candidates, however, may still behave in ways that
try to shore up their local reputation in the anticipation for a potential campaign. A
second problem is that in models of legislator behavior that try to examine the effect
of progressive ambitions, the independent variable is based on an observed activity
(running for local office) that happens after the behavior being explained.
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2.3 Research Design
This paper addresses these limitations in two ways. First, I use data from the Mex-
ican case, where an institutional feature (the ban on consecutive reelection) makes
it possible to make plausible assumptions about Mexican politicians’ immediate ca-
reer ambitions. Unlike cases like Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay mentioned above
where reelection is possible, every Mexican federal legislator will be forced to look
for another job as their term ends. In this case, progressive ambition is essentially
exogenously applied to any politician interested in maintaining an electoral career.
Therefore, I treat progressive ambition in this case as a common latent trait among
all legislators. Secondly, and unlike other studies of progressive ambition in Mex-
ico, I exploit the staggered nature of federal, state, and municipal electoral calendars
as a source of exogenous variation in electoral opportunities. The presence of these
electoral opportunities activates the latent progressive ambitions of term-limited leg-
islators. To illustrate this point, Figure 2.1 shows that there is considerable variation
across Mexico’s political geography in the timing of elections. More importantly, one
should note that all federal deputies and senators are elected at the same time. For
example, the horizontal line at the 1st of July 2012 is the point when members of
the 62nd Legislature were elected into office. Comparing each state delegation, it
is apparent that federal legislators experience different electoral opportunity struc-
tures based on the point in time of their legislative term. For instance, deputies in
Aguascalientes will have the opportunity to run for local offices after their first year
in congress. At the same time, deputies in Jalisco will not have that opportunity
until the end of their third year.
Previous research has shown that these subnational posts have become increas-
ingly important in the careers of Mexican politicians (Be´jar Algazi 2012). As elec-
tions have become more competitive since the period of PRI one-party dominance,
Langston (2006) finds that the PRI has been forced to search for politicians popular
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Mexican Elections: 2009-2015
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with local voters when making senate candidate nominations. Looking at the ca-
reer paths of federal deputies in the post-democratic-transition period, Langston and
Aparicio (2008) find that many politicians begin their careers in municipal and state
arenas, and then go on to return to these localities after their legislative term. Study-
ing a broader range of Mexican political elites, Camp (2010, 32-39) finds that the
share of prominent national politicians holding office who were mayors has steadily
increased from 6% during the De la Madrid administration (1982-1988) to 21% un-
der the Caldero´n administration (2006-2012). In the same time period, the share of
national politicians who were state legislators rose from 12% to 35%. Camp goes on
to underscore the growing importance of having been a mayor in the career paths
of governors, which are among the nation’s most prominent political positions. In
the period between the De la Madrid and Caldero´n administrations, the share of
governors who were mayors has risen from 31% to 71%.
The value of subnational elected office is also apparent to federal legislators serving
in the Chamber of Deputies. Kerevel (2015) finds that the percentage of immediate
positions sought or obtained by federal deputies after leaving office that were mayor-
ships or local deputy seats increased from 19.3% to 41.6% from the 57th (1997-2000)
to the 60th (2006-2009) legislatures, respectively. These posts are valuable enough to
term-limited deputies that they are willing to campaign for local office after only a
year into their federal term. For example, one can look at the case of Baja California,
which Figure 2.1 shows had statewide elections in 2013. In that year, three sitting
federal deputies from that state, Fernando Castro Trenti, Gilberto Hirata Chico, and
Benjamı´n Castillo Valdez stood as candidates for governor, mayor, and local deputy,
respectively. This does not take into account federal deputies from Baja Califor-
nia who may have sought local posts but failed to secure their party’s nomination.
This case, along with the empirical evidence cited above, demonstrates that Mexi-
can federal deputies have good reason to be mindful of local electoral opportunities,
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especially the timing of these opportunities in the context of their single term.
My empirical strategy of using the staggered federal and local electoral calendars
draws from diverse studies that treat the timing of elections as an exogenous variable
to explain political behavior. This is particularly notable in research on the political
business cycle, which posits that government’s spending patterns are conditioned by
the electoral calendar (Alesina et al. 1997). In Mexico, Rosas and Langston (2011)
leveraged the same features of the electoral calendar noted above to estimate the
causal influence of governors on their co-partisan deputies in the national legislature.
Similarly, Berliner and Erlich (2015) exploit variation in the timing of elections and
the lengths of the proceeding lame duck periods in order to assess the relationship
between electoral competition and Mexican states’ adoption of access to information
laws.
Building on the progressive ambition literature, I examine if and how the desire for
subnational office influences the extent to which a legislator’s activities are oriented
toward serving her district. I expect that term-limited legislators who face the coming
prospect of being able to run for local offices in their district are more likely to engage
in activities that serve district interests than legislators who do not have the same
upcoming opportunity. It is important to note that, unlike previous analyses of
legislator behavior (including the Mexican case) that use the legislator’s term as the
unit of analysis, I exploit the meaningful variation across time that can accurately
reflect the changing electoral opportunity structure.
2.3.1 Dependent Variables
In order to examine the effects of the local electoral opportunity structure on the
responsiveness of federal deputies to district interests, it is necessary to define the
measurement strategy for such a behavior. In other words, how can I measure re-
sponsiveness to the interests of the district in the context of the Mexican congress? In
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the American politics literature, where scholars have placed greater focus on dyadic
representation than in the field of comparative politics, the standard approach is to
use the voting record of representatives and measure the extent to which this behavior
reflects the ideological preferences of their district (Clinton 2006, Bartels 2008). How-
ever, the applicability of this approach to the Mexican context is limited by features
of the political system. As stated earlier, the combination of a ban on consecutive
reelection and party control of campaign resources and nomination procedures has
resulted in party discipline that is comparatively high (Nacif 2002, Carey 2009) for
the region. As a result, roll call voting and policy initiatives are areas of legislative
behavior dictated primarily by the national party (Be´jar Algazi 2006).
While voting is an important aspect of a legislator’s ability to represent her dis-
trict, it is not the only means by which she can serve the interests of the district and
ultimately increase her own reputation in the district. Representation is a multidi-
mensional concept (Pitkin 1967) and representatives’ behaviors toward that end will
also vary. Aside from the legislator’s role as a voter on the chamber floor, scholars of
representation have also paid substantial attention to activities such as constituency
service, pork-barreling, and communication with the district. These behaviors offer
an avenue for legislators to develop a base of support that is independent of their
partisan affiliation, referred to as “the personal vote” (Cain et al. 1987).
One such activity available to legislators is the bill submission process (Schiller
1995). In Mexico, there are two types of bills federal deputies can submit: iniciati-
vas (initiatives) and proposiciones con punto de acuerdo (propositions). As Kerevel
(2010, 699) notes, “initiatives are formal bills and involve substantive legislation,
such as Constitutional reform, proposing a new law, or reforming an existing law.
Propositions are not actual legislation, but are pronouncements made by individual
legislators on political, cultural, economic and social matters.” The key difference is
that while the development and content of initiatives is largely the purview of the
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national parties (as noted above), propositions offer legislators the ability to engage
in credit-claiming or position taking. As I will demonstrate below, these propositions
are often used to request federal funding go to particular projects or that federal re-
sources (often particular agencies) be directed toward solving some local concern. In
his study of legislative behavior in Mexico’s mixed-member electoral system, Kerevel
(2010) treats the number of initiatives and propositions submitted by deputies as
measures of activity directed towards national and parochial concerns respectively.
He finds that deputies elected in single-member districts (SMD) submit more propo-
sitions whereas deputies elected in proportional representation (PR) districts submit
more initiatives. This is in line with the expectation in the mixed-member system lit-
erature that SMD representatives will work to favor local interests while PR legislators
will serve the parties that placed them on the ballot list. The use of bill submission
activity in this and other studies as a measure of legislator’s national or parochial
orientation provides a firm foundation for developing a measure of responsiveness to
district interests based on proposition submission.
With this motivation, I wrote a Python script to scrape the propositions submitted
by federal deputies in the 62nd Legislature (2012-2015) available online in the Gaceta
Parliamentaria, the congressional record. For each proposition, I am able to record
the author (or co-authors) of the bill, the date on which it was submitted, and a brief
description of the bill. From these descriptions, I then coded bills for whether they
targeted local interests. This was done by going through each bill’s description and
coding whether a bill relates to the state or municipalities in the deputy’s district.
In the simple case, this means that a municipality or state is specifically referenced
in the description. For example, a deputy can call on a federal agency to lower
electricity rates for their state. It is important to note that the locality or geographic
area referenced in the bill must be in the deputy’s district or state. There are many
cases of deputies submitting bills concerning issues in other areas of the country. For
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example, following the mass disappearance of students from the Ayotzinapa teachers’
college in the fall of 2014, numerous deputies from outside Guerrero submitted bills
calling on federal and state authorities to investigate the matter. Unless the deputy
is from Guerrero, such a bill is not coded as locally-targeted. In a more complicated
case, the description refers to a program or initiative that would directly benefit the
deputy’s district. Examples of this second case include propositions to protect local
crops or industries from foreign competition, developing government programs to
benefit local industries, and establishing special committees that deal with industries
important to the state or district. Yet, simply because a bill targets a specific industry
does not mean it is considered locally-targeted. In many cases, legislators will submit
bills that concern industries that are difficult to clearly associate with their district,
or often any area. For example, a bill may request a federal agency develop programs
to regulate used car sales. While it is possible that such a bill may reference an
idiosyncratic local issue, without a clear association to a geographic area, I code such
bills as not locally-targeted.
In order to demonstrate the validity of using locally-targeted propositions as a
measure of responsiveness to the district’s interests, I provide some examples of propo-
sitions that were coded as locally-targeted. The following are descriptions of a few of
the local propositions included in the analyses that follow:
 Mar´ıa Teresa Jime´nez Esquivel (PAN) of Aguascalientes’ 2nd district presented
a “proposition which requests the Attorney General of the Republic to use its
power of jurisdiction to investigate the alleged criminal acts in the disappearance
in similar fashion of women in Aguascalientes.”
 Salvador Ortiz Garc´ıa (PRI) of Michoaca´n’s 12th district presented a “propo-
sition which exhorts the Secretariat of Public Education to revise and update
the annual stipends granted to students at the Universidad Michoacana de San
Nicola´s de Hidalgo.”
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 Javier Filiberto Guevara Gonza´lez (PRI) of Puebla’s 14th district presented
a “proposition which exhorts INEGI to revise and in some cases modify the
indices of social development referred to in articles 34 and 35 of the Law of Fis-
cal Coordination since their application has resulted in disadvantaging several
municipalities of Puebla.”
 Heriberto Manuel Galindo Quin˜ones (PRI), a PR representative from Sinaloa (a
major producer and exporter of tomatoes), presented a “proposition pertaining
to the termination of the Agreement on Mexican Tomato Imports to the United
States; and the creation of a special committee to assist, support, and defend
the local producers of the fruit, particularly those focused on exporting.”
Using this coding scheme, out of 2,959 instances in which a deputy authored (or
coauthored) a proposition, 645 of those instances were locally-targeted propositions.2
With these entries I can generate counts of the number of locally-targeted propositions
a deputy submits at different points in time of their term. In the analyses below, I
use the legislator-legislative year as the unit of analysis. Therefore, the dependent
variable is the count of locally-targeted propositions a deputy presents in a given
legislative year.3
In order to test the auxiliary hypothesis concerning legislators’ party discipline, I
gathered roll call data for all recorded votes taken in Mexico’s lower house in the 2012-
2015 legislative term from the Gaceta Parlametaria.4 Following previous analyses of
party discipline in the Mexican context, I measure discipline using a party unity
score for an individual legislator (Dı´az Rebolledo 2005, Weldon 2008, Kerevel 2010).
It is the number of times the legislator voted the same position as the majority of
2Deputies can also cosponsor propositions. For these analyses however, I only focus on whether a deputy
is listed as being one of the bills presenters.
3In the Chamber of Deputies, there are three legislative years with two ordinary periods each (Fall 2012-
Spring 2013, Fall 2013-Spring 2014, Fall 2014-Spring 2015). With the deputy- legislative year as the unit of
analysis, the count of locally targeted bills in the data ranges from 0 to 11, with a median value of 0 and a
mean of .41.
4http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/
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her party, divided by the total number of actual votes taken.5 Simply stated, it
measures how frequently the deputy votes along the party line. Again, since the level
of analysis is the deputy-year, the party unity score is calculated for votes taken in a
given legislative year.
2.3.2 Independent Variables
The primary independent variable of interest is whether a deputy faces the prospect
of local elections in her state at the end of the legislative year. I use this simple indi-
cator variable as the independent variable for several reasons. First, since statewide
elections in this period are held during the summer, the legislative year preceding that
summer provides a natural length of time that also corresponds with the manner in
which the legislative schedule is organized (with two periods, fall and spring, for each
year). Second, it provides a simple comparison between deputies from states where
there are statewide elections in the summer and those where there are no upcoming
elections, for a given legislative year. Finally, I do not utilize a more continuous
measure such as months or weeks from a local election because this would not be
in line with the reality of Mexican politics, where deputies who wish to campaign
for another post (or contest a primary for a candidacy) must request a leave of ab-
sence from the chamber and therefore would not be able to submit locally-targeted
propositions during points of the spring legislative period.
In a context where legislators are limited to one term and subnational posts are
valuable components of political careers, I expect that the opportunity of a coming
local election will motivate progressively ambitious deputies to engage in behaviors
that can increase their appeal to voters back in the district. One means by which
they can accomplish this is through submission of propositions that signal the deputy’s
5Absences were excluded from the calculation. Abstentions were considered as voting against the partys
position, except in cases where a partys position was abstention. I also exclude any roll call votes in which
there were no dissenting votes from the calculation of party unity scores since many votes are noncontrover-
sial and their inclusion artificially inflates the extent of party unity.
24
responsiveness to local concerns and interests. Therefore, I expect a coming election
to increase the number of locally-targeted propositions.
I also include other variables to control for factors that have been found to influ-
ence legislative behavior in Mexico. The first is the deputy’s mode of election (either
through SMD or PR), since this has been found to influence the type of bills deputies
submit. SMD deputies are more likely to submit propositions and PR deputies are
more likely to submit initiatives (Kerevel 2010). Another important variable is the
influence of a co-partisan governor in the deputy’s state. Specifically, I code whether
a deputy has a co-partisan governor whose term outlasts that of the deputy. Pre-
vious work has shown that this type of governor can influence the voting patterns
of the state’s delegation of deputies, because such a governor can provide deputies
with resources for campaigns or provide positions in the state bureaucracy after their
term (Langston 2010, Rosas and Langston 2011). I expect that, to the extent that
deputies are using locally-targeted bills as a means of building their electoral support
in the district, co-partisan governors should have a negative effect on the number of
propositions they submit. The reason for this is that a co-partisan governor who will
be around after the deputy’s term ends provides the legislator with opportunities to
advance their political career outside of appealing to district interest and cultivat-
ing local electoral support. Specifically, governors can offer career paths in the state
bureaucracy and state party where the governor is the de facto leader. With these
possible non-electoral career paths, deputies may place less focus on building personal
electoral support through their bill submission.
I also control for partisanship by including a set of party indicator variables (for
the PAN, PRD, and PVEM) as well as a minor party indicator (which includes PT,
PANAL, and Movimiento Ciudadano). The PRI are the reference category since they
are the party in government during the 62nd legislature. I also include an indicator
of whether a deputy switched parties during their term and whether the deputy is an
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alternate.6 Finally, the models include an indicator for the deputy’s gender, with a
value of zero for male and one for female. Previous research has found that women
are more active than men in legislatures (Anzia and Berry 2011, Kerevel and Atkeson
2013). Moreover, in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, women are found to submit
more initiatives (Ba´rcena Jua´rez 2017). Therefore, I expect that women submit more
locally-targeted propositions on average.
2.4 Explaining Locally-Targeted Bill Submission
Since I am interested in the effect of a coming election at the end of the legislative
year, the unit of analysis is the deputy-legislative year. I pool the three years in
the data together into a single model. Specifically, I first fit a negative binomial
regression since the dependent variable is a count with overdispersion.7 In order to
account for intragroup correlation of observations at the deputy level, standard errors
are clustered by deputy.8 Since there are multiple years pooled in the model, I also
include legislative year indicator variables with the first year as the reference category.
This is to account for year specific factors that may affect all legislators.
Table 2.1 shows the results of the mixed effects negative binomial model in column
(1).9 The effect of a coming local election is in the expected direction (positive) and
statistically significant at the .05 level. Among the other variables, PAN, PRD,
and minor party affiliation are also significant positive predictors of the number of
6Each deputy is elected along with an alternate who steps in if the deputy temporarily or permanently
steps out of office. Since office holders must temporarily step down while they campaign for another office,
there are many alternates who come in during the spring legislative period and serve briefly. I include only
deputies who served in more than one ordinary period.
7The conditional variance is over 2.5 times greater than the mean, violating the necessary assumption in
order to fit a poisson model. The model presented in Table 2.1 was estimated using the nbreg command in
STATA 14.2.
8As an alternative to fitting a model with clustered standard errors, I also ran a mixed effects negative
binomial model with deputies as the second level grouping. The results of this model, available upon request,
are substantively identical to the model reported in Table 2.1.
9Table 2.3 in the appendix shows the results of negative binomial regressions for each legislative year
individually.
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Table 2.1: Count Models Predicting the Number of Locally-Targeted Propositions
(1) (2)
Neg. Binomial Poisson FE
Coming Local Election=1 0.757∗ 0.658∗
(0.135) (0.131)
Mode of Election (PR=1) -0.0184
(0.156)
Co-Partisan Governor -0.329∗
(0.151)
PAN 0.627∗
(0.197)
PRD 0.374+
(0.204)
PVEM -0.278
(0.356)
Other Minor Party 0.766∗
(0.292)
Party Switcher 0.477+
(0.279)
Alternate -0.293
(0.373)
Gender (Female=1) 0.0500
(0.152)
Leg. Year 2013-14 0.210 0.229+
(0.140) (0.133)
Leg. Year 2014-15 -0.299∗ -0.146
(0.122) (0.135)
Constant -1.417∗
(0.181)
lnalpha 0.879∗
(0.118)
Observations 1522 712
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by deputy.
+ p< 0.10, ∗ p< 0.05
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locally-targeted propositions a deputy presents. The interpretation of these effects of
partisanship are intuitive to the extent that opposition partisans are more willing to
put pressure on executive agencies under a PRI government to address a local matter
and they must also resort to such propositions because they have less access to those
agency resources given their role as opposition parties. The effect of a co-partisan
governor is also negative and statistically significant, providing some support for the
expectation that deputies with co-partisan governors have access to resources that
can further their political careers that are independent of their local electoral support.
Among the null results, the finding for electoral mandate (SMD vs PR) stands out.
This suggests that the local electoral opportunity structure rather than the mode
of election is what motivates deputies’ responsiveness to the district. Finally, there
is also no substantive difference between men and women in the average number of
locally-targeted bills they submit.10
In order to interpret the substantive significance of local electoral opportunities,
Figure 2.2 plots predicted counts of locally-targeted propositions for deputies facing
different electoral prospects for each of the three major parties in the legislature. All
other variables are held at their median, meaning these predictions reflect deputies
who were elected via single member districts, do not have a co-partisan governor
whose term outlasts the deputy’s, are not party switchers or alternates, and are male.
Substantively, an approaching local election at the end of the legislative year will
lead to a .27 increase in the predicted count for PRI deputies, a .51 increase in the
predicted count for PAN deputies, and a .4 increase for PRD deputies. These effects
are substantively significant in light of the distribution of the number of locally-
targeted propositions across the deputy-year observations in the data, with 76.5%
10Previous research had found that women submit more (programmtically-oriented) initiatives (Ba´rcena
Jua´rez 2017) as well as maintain broad portfolios in their policy-making agendas (Schwindt-Bayer 2010).
Combined with the null result here regarding a more particularistic behavior, this suggests that female legis-
lators in Mexico engage in programmatic position-taking without being less responsive to local issues.
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Number of Locally-Targeted Propositions for Deputies of Major Par-
ties
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having values of zero and 14.7% submitting one for the year.11
As a check of the robustness of the results of the model in column (1), I also
include in Table 2.1 the results of a poisson regression with deputy fixed effects. I
opt for this model since the negative binomial with fixed effects produces inconsistent
estimates caused by the incidental parameters problem (Cameron and Trivedi 1998,
280-282). The deputy fixed effects control for any time-invariant factors that may
influence a deputy’s propensity to submit locally-targeted bills. For this reason, the
control variables in column (1) drop out. They are factors that only vary between
deputies and not within a deputy in the panel data. The results in column (2)
demonstrate that the positive relationship between a coming local election and local
bill submission is robust to a fixed effects specification.
2.4.1 Local Electoral Opportunities and Party Discipline
To further unpack the effect of career ambitions and electoral opportunities on leg-
islative responsiveness, I also examine their possible influence on legislators’ party
discipline. So far, I have argued that legislators are more responsive to district in-
terests in the lead up to local elections in an effort to build local electoral support.
This explanation is rooted in the notion that deputies are working to cultivate a
personal reputation that is independent of their party. An alternative explanation of
the mechanism connecting electoral opportunities and responsiveness is one in which
loyal partisans engage in behaviors responsive to the district to advance the electoral
prospects of the party. To adjudicate between these different explanations, Table 2.2
summarizes the results of OLS models of a legislator’s party unity score (i.e. how
often they vote with their party).
The results in column (1) are broadly consistent with conventional theoretical ex-
pectations regarding party unity. PR representatives are more likely to vote the party
11The mean of locally-targeted propositions submitted in a legislative year was .41.
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Table 2.2: Models of Party Unity Voting
(1) (2)
OLS OLS FE
Coming Local Election=1 -0.356+ -0.408+
(0.210) (0.213)
Mode of Election (PR=1) 1.273∗
(0.426)
Co-Partisan Governor -0.0395
(0.389)
PAN -5.640∗
(0.239)
PRD -15.18∗
(0.776)
PVEM 0.867+
(0.465)
Other Minor Party -11.14∗
(1.350)
Alternate 0.451
(0.906)
Party Switcher -4.764∗
(1.525)
Gender (Female=1) -0.394
(0.412)
Leg. Year 2013-14 -1.474∗ -1.517∗
(0.210) (0.208)
Leg. Year 2014-15 -0.0722 -0.102
(0.220) (0.222)
Constant 98.09∗ 92.98∗
(0.314) (0.145)
R-squared 0.592 0.0466
Number of Deputies 522 522
Observations 1517 1517
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p< 0.10, ∗ p< 0.05
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line. Opposition Deputies (PAN and PRD) are less likely to vote with their parties
than deputies from the party in government. Deputies who switch parties during their
term are also less likely to vote with their parties. As for the relationship of inter-
est, a coming local election is associated with a decrease in a deputy’s propensity to
vote the party line, although this coefficient estimate is only marginally statistically
significant. While the substantive size of the effect may seem small in comparison to
the dependent variable’s range of values (42 to 100 in the data), a more appropriate
comparison would be the magnitude of other substantively important variables in the
model. For example, the effect of a coming local election is roughly a third of the
magnitude of the effect of a deputy being elected from the PR tier. The distinction
between PR and SMD has received substantial attention in the literature on party
unity (Haspel et al. 1998, Thames 2001, Thames 2005, Ferrara 2004, Olivella and
Tavits 2014) and is therefore a useful benchmark for the substantive importance of the
effect size. Column (2) reports the results of a model including deputy fixed effects.
The conclusions of the simple OLS model are robust to controlling for time-invariant
factors across deputies.
Taken together, the results summarized in this section provide support for Hypoth-
esis 1. The presence of local electoral opportunities motivates term-limited legislators
to be responsive to the concerns of constituents. This is supported by the robust pos-
itive relationship between a legislator having a local election in their state at the end
of the legislative year and the number of locally-targeted bills they submit in that leg-
islative year. These bills, focused on issues of importance to constituents, are aimed
at building local electoral support for the deputy. Furthermore, the analysis of leg-
islator’s roll call voting supports Hypothesis 2, which sheds light on the mechanism
driving responsiveness. Rather than locally-targeted bill submission being carried
out by loyal partisans hoping to improve their party’s standing with voters in the dis-
trict, a coming local election is associated with greater defection from the party line.
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This evidence is consistent with the notion that deputies are seeking to build their
personal reputation rather than support the party brand. Moreover, the combined
empirical findings are consistent with comparative research linking strong local ties
and individual support bases with maverick voting behavior in the legislature (Tavits
2009).
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that local electoral opportunities play an important
role in activating the progressive ambitions of deputies in a way that makes them
more responsive to their district’s interests. In cases where Mexican deputies face the
prospect of a statewide election at the end of the legislative year, they submit more
locally-targeted propositions than deputies from states without local elections at the
end of the legislative year. This demonstrates that the presence of local electoral
opportunities activates the progressive ambition inherent in term-limited representa-
tives. Moreover, local electoral opportunities are also associated with greater defec-
tion from the party line in deputies’ roll call votes, suggesting the mechanism is one
of personal vote cultivation rather than party discipline. This paper also provides
a stepping stone for further research on the ways in which local electoral contexts
can influence the degree of responsiveness of federal representatives to local matters.
Mexico’s recent constitutional reform allowing for reelection raises many questions.
One possible implication is that the legislative behavior characterized in this paper
may be unlinked from the local electoral cycle as deputies as well as senators will be
able to seek out the opportunity to stay in the current posts. Adding to legislators’
considerations about pursuing static or progressive career moves is the likelihood that
they may now have to face an incumbent (either in the general election or the pri-
mary), compared to the previous state of affairs where every race was for an open
seat. These new dynamics provide ample research opportunities.
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This paper has shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom that the ban
on reelection severs the link between representative and constituency, there is some
connection provided through the progressive ambition of legislators. Local electoral
opportunities, which arise at different times for different deputies, motivate legislators
to represent local interests in the prospects of future electoral rewards. Also contrary
to previous research, parties are not the sole drivers of legislators’ political behavior.
By examining the case of Mexico, with its ban on immediate reelection, this paper
provides insight into the causal effects of local electoral contexts on the district-
oriented behaviors of legislators across many of the world’s democracies where rates
of reelection are low and subnational offices are valuable.
2.6 Appendix
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Table 2.3: Models of the Number of Locally-Targeted Propositions for Each Legislative
Year
(1) (2) (3)
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
Coming Local Election=1 0.971∗ 1.045+ 0.334
(0.173) (0.563) (0.238)
Mode of Election (PR=1) -0.0517 -0.209 0.218
(0.188) (0.260) (0.251)
Co-Partisan Governor -0.448∗ -0.479+ -0.0102
(0.193) (0.265) (0.260)
PAN 0.225 0.625∗ 1.272∗
(0.225) (0.309) (0.318)
PRD 0.223 -0.0337 1.232∗
(0.240) (0.326) (0.312)
PVEM -0.758+ -0.501 0.797+
(0.455) (0.542) (0.482)
Other Minor Party -0.0861 0.606 1.852∗
(0.363) (0.432) (0.440)
Party Switcher 0.522 0.440 0.417
(0.407) (0.486) (0.467)
Alternate -0.998 0.533 -1.799
(0.670) (0.570) (1.104)
Gender (Female=1) -0.0695 0.0482 0.176
(0.181) (0.241) (0.233)
Constant -1.175∗ -1.020∗ -2.299∗
(0.207) (0.256) (0.329)
lnalpha 0.0372 1.192∗ 0.979∗
(0.258) (0.189) (0.196)
Observations 511 505 506
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.025 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p< 0.10, ∗ p< 0.05
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd min max count
Number of Locally-Targeted Bills 0.41 1.00 0 11 1522
Party Unity Voting 92.30 8.14 42 100 1517
Coming Local Election 0.34 0.47 0 1 1522
Co-Partisan Governor 0.39 0.49 0 1 1522
PAN 0.23 0.42 0 1 1522
PRD 0.20 0.40 0 1 1522
PVEM 0.07 0.25 0 1 1522
Other Minor Party 0.09 0.28 0 1 1522
Alternate 0.04 0.19 0 1 1522
Party Switcher 0.05 0.23 0 1 1522
Gender (Female=1) 0.37 0.48 0 1 1522
Leg. Year 2013-14 0.33 0.47 0 1 1522
Leg. Year 2014-15 0.33 0.47 0 1 1522
36
Chapter 3
Legislative Voting and Electoral Accountability: The Case of Mexico’s VAT Reform
3.1 Introduction
A critical component of theories of electoral accountability is that voters will
sanction their representatives when they fail to act in constituents’ interest. This is
theorized to take different forms: collective (or partisan) accountability which entails
voters punishing/rewarding parties based on their overall policy brands and individ-
ual accountability which entails voters responding to the position taking of individual
legislators (Carey 2009). While both forms of accountability are normatively impor-
tant and significant across most electoral systems, the empirical work connecting
roll call votes (the most salient form of position taking in legislatures) to electoral
accountability has focused mostly on individual accountability (Canes-Wrone et al.
2002, Nyhan et al. 2012, Rogers 2017) and has eschewed an integrated analysis of
the two mechanisms of accountability. In this paper, I investigate the dynamics of
electoral accountability with attention to both forms. Do voters punish or reward
parties for the roll call votes of their deputies? In addressing this question, I test
for both mechanisms of accountability and provide insight into the conditions that
strengthen or attenuate these forms of accountability.
I examine the connection between legislative voting and electoral accountability
using the case of Mexico’s recent fiscal reform which resulted in changes to the na-
tion’s value-added tax (VAT) rate. The uneven effects of this reform, which resulted
in a VAT hike for certain regions, provide useful leverage in identifying areas ad-
versely affected by a roll call vote in the congress. Utilizing a difference-in-difference
research design, I provide causal estimates of the effects of the VAT reform on the vote
shares of parties overall (collective accountability) as well as by individual deputies’
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districts. The results show that both forms of accountability are present in this case.
Moreover, the intensity of any electoral sanction/reward effect is contingent on party
brands and their proximity to the reform as well as the individual positions taken
by deputies. In the first section, I discuss models of accountability and the factors
that condition them and apply these insights to explain accountability behavior with
respect to Mexico’s VAT reform. I then describe the data and empirical strategy
used to estimate the effect of reform votes as well as discuss alternative estimation
strategies. After discussing the results of the different models of accountability, I
provide multiple robustness checks for the relationship between VAT hike incidence
and electoral accountability. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for
the comparative study of accountability.
3.2 Theories of Electoral Accountability
The threat of electoral sanction is the linchpin in theoretical accounts of how
elected officials are deterred from deviating from the preferred positions of their con-
stituents (Ferejohn 1986). For legislators, these positions most clearly present them-
selves in terms of roll call votes. There is evidence that legislators are punished at
the ballot box for unpopular votes (Clark 1996, Nyhan et al. 2012) and positions
out of sync with their constituents (Canes-Wrone et al. 2012), although this electoral
sanctioning is found to be contingent on the characteristics of the vote and the insti-
tutional context (Bovitz, and Carson 2006, Guisinger 2009, Vivyan and Wagner 2012,
Rogers 2017). While these studies focus on the electoral costs in terms of individual
accountability (i.e., the roll call’s effect on an individual legislator’s reelection), elec-
toral sanction also operates in terms of collective accountability. This refers to voters
holding a party accountable for the policies its members collectively undertake and
advocate. Since these collective actions are the aggregation of individual legislators’
positions, it is important to ask how a roll call vote by a legislator affects the electoral
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fortunes of their party.
The distinction between collective (or partisan) accountability and individual ac-
countability is particularly important in the comparative politics literature where
there is ample variation across countries in terms of which form is theorized to pre-
dominate (Shugart and Carey 1995, Carey 2009). Generally, a candidate’s (re)election
likelihood is a function of both their personal and their party’s reputation (Cox and
McCubbins 1993). Both of these components are influenced by legislators’ actions
in office, namely their votes on legislation. However, the empirical literature on roll
call votes and electoral accountability cited above has focused on operationalizing
accountability in terms of the costs (or gains) for incumbents based on their indi-
vidual votes, rather than the effect of those roll call votes on their party’s brand
(e.g., collective accountability). These previous studies are limited by the use of the
incumbent and their electoral fortunes as the unit of analysis, which forces the focus
on individual accountability. Moreover, for most policies it is difficult to characterize
the incidence of a roll call’s effects such that we can separate those bearing costs and
those benefiting, and thus connect those identified groups to support or sanction of
parties and legislators.
To what extent is electoral sanction/reward motivated by party brand and how
much is motivated by the individual actions of representatives? Despite the empirical
limitations of previous work, it is of theoretical importance to understand how the
two forms of accountability operate simultaneously. Normatively, both are seen as
useful mechanisms of popular control of government, but the empirical literature is
silent on how they work in tandem. I argue that the importance of either factor
(party brand or individual legislators’ position-taking) is dependent on the electoral
context. An important conditioning factor is what happens after the policy change
triggered by the roll call, specifically the campaign strategies pursued by parties and
politicians. Parties can work to develop ownership over an issue in a way that is
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electorally advantageous (Petrocik 1996). Previous research has shown that the con-
tent of campaign appeals can influence the extent to which voters engage in economic
voting (Vavreck 2009, Hart 2013). These findings for retrospective voting can also
be applied to instances where voters mobilize around issues impacted by specific roll
calls. Therefore, in instances where the party has developed clear ownership over an
issue, it is possible that we should see a more predominant role for electoral account-
ability based on party brands. Conversely, where parties stake unclear associations
or attenuate the party’s association with a policy, then the individual positions of
legislators should be more consequential for electoral accountability.
In this paper I use the case of legislative voting in Mexico. This is a particularly
important case for parsing out the different forms of accountability: collective and
individual. This distinction is of particular relevance for the Mexican case. In the
period of study, Mexico had the unique institution of a constitutional ban on consec-
utive reelection.1 This means that at the end of the legislative term, no individual
incumbents will be on the ballot. However, their party or coalition will be. In such
an institutional context, the conventional perspective on electoral accountability is
one where term-limited elected officials are kept in line by their parties to facilitate
the election of future generations of party members in the district (Alesina and Spear
1988). Since voters will have the ability to sanction the former official’s party at
the next election, parties have an incentive to induce their members to satisfy con-
stituent demands. This raises the question of whether an individual legislator’s roll
call is electorally consequential. Do voters respond to the individual votes of their
deputies in congress when deciding whether to vote for their party in the next elec-
tion? In other words, does individual accountability play a role in elections or are
electoral sanction and reward largely based on partisan reputations? Moreover, can
parties influence this electoral sanctioning and reward behavior in how they address
1The constitution was reformed in 2014 to allow for a limited number of consecutive terms. Federal
legislators elected in the 2018 election were the first to be eligible for reelection.
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the policies produced by individual roll calls (i.e. the party brands around policies)?
To answer these questions, I exploit a 2013 tax reform that affected an identifiable
geographic area of the country to evaluate the extent of electoral sanctioning.
3.3 The Politics of Mexicos Fiscal Reform
The reform of the nation’s VAT serves as an important case for studying elec-
toral accountability for both normative and empirical reasons. On a normative level,
questions of taxation and who bears the costs of government services are central to
politics and important cases for studying legislative accountability. This is evident
in the political debates surrounding attempts to reform the VAT rate(s), which have
cut across regional and ideological cleavages. Since its introduction in 1980, Mexico’s
VAT has included a different (reduced) rate for the border areas in the north and
south of the country. The original purposes of a differential rate were to provide re-
lief from increased distribution costs for peripheral areas resulting from the distance
to central supply centers as well as to narrow the gap in price competition between
goods in the Mexican side and those of neighboring foreign cities (Fuentes Flores et
al. 2016, 63). This component of the VAT system in Mexico has added a regional
dimension to debates about reforming or adjusting tax rates.
Along with the geographic component created from using different rates, discourse
over VAT policy has also fallen along ideological cleavages. On one side, conservative
elements such as the previous PAN administrations have tried to reform the VAT
as part of a larger project to decrease the government’s reliance on petroleum as a
source of revenue.2 In practice, this has included attempts to remove exemptions in
the VAT for food and medicine. Naturally, these attempts have been opposed by
lawmakers on the left, as the cost of any expansion of the VAT would fall heavily
on lower income groups given the regressive nature of the consumption tax. The
2Decreasing the government’s reliance on oil revenue also relates directly to larger conservative goals of
privatizing the state-owned oil sector.
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combined regional and ideological cleavages have made sweeping reforms to the VAT
difficult. For example, the Caldero´n administration had to settle for a modest one
percent increase (for both the border zone and rest of the country) in 2010 (Gutie´rrez
2013).
This serves as the backdrop of the legislative vote on fiscal reform that I use to test
for electoral accountability. In the fall of 2013, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies
passed a reform of the tax system that was part of the broader structural reform
packages of the PRI government of Enrique Pen˜a Nieto. A salient part of this reform
was a change in the nation’s VAT rate. Following the rationale of the previous PAN
administrations, the broader fiscal reforms were intended to reduce the government’s
reliance on oil revenues in exchange for greater reliance on taxation. With respect to
the VAT, the reform would increase the rate in the border zone and bring it in line
with the rest of the country. Besides the need to increase revenues, the administration
justified the rate increase in the border areas on the basis that a) these areas have a
higher average income than the rest of the country and therefore a reduced VAT at an
aggregate level imposes a regressive effect, b) the border areas had sufficiently devel-
oped infrastructure to make distance from central supply centers no longer an issue,
c) producers and businesses rather than consumers were the main beneficiaries of the
lower rate considering that prices in the border region were higher than the rest of the
country, and d) the differential rate creates distortions in economic activity as people
seek to avoid the higher rate in the rest of the country (Gobierno de la Repu´blica
2013).3 The opposition to the reform consisted of both conservative and leftist ele-
ments in the congress. On the right, there were concerns about the inflationary and
overall economic effects for the border areas, especially for the PAN which draws a
lot of electoral support from the northern border. On the left, there was opposition
to the larger project of decreasing the state’s reliance on oil revenue (coupled with
3Though, it should be noted that these arguments gloss over the significant economic disparities between
the northern and southern border areas, which were treated the same for the purposes of the reform.
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reforms aimed at privatizing the energy sector) and expanding a regressive tax on
consumption. For the most part, voting on the VAT reform bill followed party lines
with the governing coalition of the PRI, PVEM, and PANAL supporting the reform,
the PAN, PT, and MC voting against, and the only substantial intraparty division
being in the PRD where members split 57 to 35, for and against.4
Aside from the substantive importance of the policy domain, Mexico’s VAT reform
serves as a useful case for testing models of electoral accountability. Previous research
has shown that a heightened salience of a roll call vote is a necessary ingredient for
electoral accountability (Bovitz, and Carson 2006, Rogers 2017). The VAT reform
was a highly salient event especially for the directly affected areas. Following the
vote, social media campaigns were started calling for the Baja California peninsula
(where the entire region was covered by the preferred rate) to separate from the rest of
nation.5 The reform has since become a perennial campaign issue. In the 2015 federal
elections, a television ad for the PAN included the following appeal: “If I told you
there existed candidates for deputy that...would fight to lower the taxes at the border
like they were before the PRI voted to raise them...we’re talking about the candidates
for deputy of the PAN. Vote for the PAN deputies in Sonora.” Even today, years after
the implementation of the reform in 2014, candidates for governor in the border states
continue to campaign on pressuring for returning to reduced rates.6 These anecdotal
accounts demonstrate that the VAT reform garnered substantial media coverage and
attention, building up the salience of the roll call.
The reform also had significant economic effects that, in turn, influenced public
opinion in the matter. Supporters for reform cited relatively short inflationary periods
resulting from previous hikes in the VAT (Aportela Rodr´ıguez and Werner Wainfeld
4Aside from the PRD, there were only five legislators who voted against the majority of their party: four
from the PRI and one from the PVEM. The overall breakdown of the vote was 291 in favor, 178 against, and
one abstention.
5https://www.sdpnoticias.com/columnas/2014/04/25/baja-california-y-el-berrinche-por-el-16-de-iva.
6https://elorbe.com/portada/2018/02/06/es-injusto-que-la-frontera-sur-pague-iva-era-propone-que-la-
zee-inicie-operaciones-este-ano.html.
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2002), which facilitated expansions in government revenue (Tijerina-Guajardo and
Paga´n 2000). However, a study of the economic effects of the VAT increase in the
border areas shows that there was a prolonged surge in inflation throughout 2014, as
well as indirect effects on costs of living including food prices. Moreover, there were
indications that consumers were traveling over the border more frequently to purchase
goods in neighboring foreign cities (Fuentes Flores et al. 2016). These economic
effects also translated into broader public opinion. In a nationally representative
survey fielded in July and August of 2014, of six different reforms passed by the Pen˜a
Nieto administration up to that point, the fiscal reform had the largest share (53%)
of respondents reporting that the reform would hurt them and their families as well
as the smallest share (21%) reporting that the reform would benefit them and their
families (Parametr´ıa 2014).
Important features of Mexico’s VAT system also facilitate empirically testing for
electoral accountability of legislators’ roll call votes. Since the aim of this analysis is
to examine whether voters punish legislators or their parties for roll call votes that
are against voters’ preferences, it is necessary to understand what outcome voters in a
given district or area preferred. In the studies of electoral accountability cited above,
such measures are frequently estimated from large scale surveys of voters’ attitudes
toward specific pieces of legislation. I am unaware of any surveys that asked about
specific provisions of the VAT reform, much less surveys with the necessary coverage
to generate estimates of district opinion. Instead, I exploit the uneven consequences
of the reform across the nation’s areas. As noted above, a peculiar feature of Mexico’s
VAT is that, since its introduction in 1980, it also included a zone in the northern
and southern borders with a reduced rate. This zone encompasses any area within
20 kilometers of the border with the United States and Guatemala, as well as the
entirety of the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, and
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partial areas of the state of Sonora.7 The 2013 reform raised the reduced rate in the
border areas from 11% to the 16% rate paid throughout the rest of the country. This
variation in the consequences of the reform (an approximately 45% increase in the
VAT rate for those in the border zone and the same rate as before for those in the
rest of the nation) allows me to identify constituencies that would engage in electoral
sanctioning from an unpopular vote in congress.8
Returning to the theories of electoral accountability addressed earlier, a simple
retrospective model of voter behavior would predict that negative economic shocks
for constituents should result in negative effects in the electoral fortunes of incumbent
parties.
H1a General Retrospection: voters in the border zone should punish in-
cumbent parties for the reform as they bear the cost of the VAT hike.
However, the positions taken by individual representatives should be consequential
as well. Rather than a uniform sanctioning effect, the electoral impact of the VAT
increase should be contingent on the district deputy’s position in supporting the fiscal
reform or not.
H1b Targeted Retrospection: voters in the border zone should punish in-
cumbent parties for the VAT hike, but this effect should be concentrated among
deputies and parties that voted for the reform.
Beyond the simple retrospective voting effects of the reform, this study is inter-
ested in the distinction between collective and individual accountability. Relating
to the first, I examine the effects on party vote shares as a result of the tax hike’s
incidence. By examining each party separately, I can assess the qualitative differences
between the party brands and their effects on electoral accountability.
H2 Collective Accountability: voters in the border zone should punish (or
reward) parties that more closely develop a party brand around the policy pro-
7See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in the appendix for a visual representation of the border zone.
8I am assuming that, all things equal, voters would have a preference to not pay higher taxes.
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duced by the reform.
Specifically, this would suggest the PAN to be closely connected to voters’ electoral
behavior as a result of the VAT reform (in this case benefiting from its opposition).
As stated above, the PAN campaigned on its opposition to the VAT hike. It was
also the only party to clearly state in its party platform for the subsequent election
that it would reverse the reform. These actions lead to a clear party brand for the
PAN on the VAT reform, which contrasts with the relative silence on the issue on the
part of the PRD and its coalition members as well as the PRI and PVEM governing
coalition.
Finally, in the absence of clear party brands relating to the VAT reform, the indi-
vidual positions taken by party members should be consequential for the sanctioning
(and reward) behavior of voters in the district.
H3 Individual Accountability: voter sanctioning (and reward) should be
contingent on the individual positions taken by deputies in the reform effort, and
this distinction should be stronger for parties with obfuscated brands regarding
reform.
Here, I will leverage the variation both between parties and individual deputies in
their positions in the VAT reform bill. A particularly useful source of variation for
testing this hypothesis is the limited number of PRI and PVEM defecting votes.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
As stated above, the main feature of using the case of the 2013 VAT reform vote
to study electoral accountability is the ability to identify areas that bore the cost of
the reform. This makes it possible to compare the electoral behavior of these areas
with the rest of the country and test for electoral sanctioning and reward for the votes
of representatives. However, as the previous discussion of the VAT would indicate,
there are many economic, social, and political differences between the border regions
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and the rest of the nation. Therefore, a straightforward cross-sectional comparison
of the incumbent party’s vote share would be misguided. Any valid research design
that attempts to make any causal inferences about the electoral effects of the VAT
change must take these differences into account.
The research design I utilize is a difference-in-difference (DD) approach that makes
comparisons between the changes in incumbent party support between the 2012 and
2015 federal legislative elections in border and non-border areas.9 This design has
several advantages. First, the panel structure of the data allows me to control for
time-invariant differences between border and non-border areas. Second, it allows me
to address the issue of electoral precincts that overlap with the 20-kilometer thresh-
old. Rather than operationalizing treatment (VAT increase) as a dummy variable, a
regression DD facilitates the study of policies where there is variation in treatment
intensity (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In this case, treatment intensity would be the
proportion of an electoral precinct covered by the preferential tax zone. Another ad-
vantage is that this design would allow me to incorporate the non-conforming areas
in the main analysis.10 Finally, a regression DD facilitates the analysis of subsam-
ples that are crucial for the theoretical motivations of the paper (e.g. districts where
deputies voted for and against the reform as well as splitting the samples by party
control of districts). In the case of an alternative regression discontinuity design, these
non-pooled analyses would lead to concerns over a reduced number of cases around
the cutoff.
An alternative research design for studying the electoral effects of the tax reform
is a regression discontinuity (RD) design. This case seems well suited for an RD
design since it has three necessary components, a running variable (distance from the
border), a cutoff (20 kilometers), and a treatment that is assigned completely based
9Note that the VAT reform vote in congress and the implementation of the changes each took place be-
tween elections.
10By non-conforming areas, I mean areas that do not conform to the 20km rule that decides preferred and
default VAT rates (whole states or municipalities that benefit from the preferred rate).
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on whether the score exceeds the cutoff (VAT increase from a formerly preferential
rate) (Skovron and Titiunik 2015). For this reason, Davis (2011) uses an RD design
to provide evidence of a distortion in economic activity toward the preferential tax
zone.11
However, there are two drawbacks to the RD design in this case. First, the
preferential tax zone also includes a few areas that are partially outside of the 20-
kilometer band. These include the entirety of the states of Baja California, Baja
California Sur, Quintana Roo, and a few municipalities in Sonora. Davis (2011)
addresses the issue of areas not conforming to the 20-kilometer rule by excluding
them from the main analysis and including them in a separate non-RD analysis.
A second, and more consequential, drawback of using the RD design in this case
is that the outcome of interest should be measured at the same level at which the
treatment is assigned (or lower and one can simply aggregate the data to the appro-
priate level). In this case, the outcome of interest is the electoral behavior of citizens
living within and outside of the preferential tax zone. Moreover, the treatment (VAT
rate and its subsequent rise post-reform) is assigned at the level of individuals and
businesses. Yet, the lowest level of disaggregation of electoral results is at the precinct
level, where precinct boundaries can (and do) overlap with the 20-kilometer boundary.
Davis (2011) faces a similar issue since his data on economic activity (the outcome of
interest) is only available at the municipal level. To address this issue, he creates a
locality-level dataset (localities being smaller geographic units than municipalities) by
allocating economic activity to localities according to their proportion of the munici-
pality population. He notes that this assumption makes for a conservative test since
it will cause the magnitude of the (economic) distortion to be understated. I decide
against using a similar approach to mitigate against the possibility that a null result
11Davis’ (2011) study is important for this paper since it provides evidence that there are clear economic
benefits for the border zone area because of the reduced VAT rate. Therefore, a reform to raise that rate to the
level of the rest of the nation would have economic costs for the region and would be expected to motivate
electoral behavior.
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is due to the conservative test (type II error). Also, from a practical perspective,
Davis (2011) could easily allocate measures of value added, total sales, and numbers
of workers, but it is unclear to me how I would similarly allocate electoral support
for the incumbent party.
To reiterate, I estimate the effect of changes in the value added tax (VAT) rate
stemming from deputies’ votes in a reform package in 2013 using a difference-in-
difference design. I leverage the existence of a border zone12 that formerly had a
reduced VAT rate compared to the rest of the nation, which saw no change in the tax
rate from the previous period. Specifically, I estimate the following model:
Yit = δt + γi+β IVAi×Post2013 +Xit + εit (3.1)
Where Yit is vote share of the single member district (SMD) incumbent party in
precinct i in election year t. Year and precinct fixed effects, δt and γi, net out overall
trends and time-invariant differences across precincts, respectively. The parameter of
interest is the coefficient on the interaction term (β ), where IVA is the percentage
of the precinct covered by the border zone, which had the reduced value added tax
(VAT or IVA in Spanish) rate, and Post2013 is an indicator equal to one for precincts
in the post-tax reform period. Xit is a set of time-varying controls, which includes a
set of dummies indicating the incumbent party of the SMD at election year t (these
are not included in the party-specific analyses) as well as the log of the number of
registered voters in the precinct (in the 100s) to control for changes in population
between elections. εit captures residual differences across precincts and years.
The data I use are primarily precinct-level electoral results for Mexico’s legislative
elections taken directly from the National Electoral Institute’s (Instituto Nacional
12The border zone is any area within 20 kilometers of the US or Guatemalan border, the entire states of
Baja California, Baja California Sur, and Quintana Roo, as well as a select few whole municipalities in the
state of Sonora. See the maps in the appendix for a visualization of the border zone.
49
Electoral, or INE) website.13 The outcome of interest is the vote share of the leg-
islative incumbent party. While this is a straightforward quantity in the abstract,
features of the Mexican system complicate matters. Specifically, parties frequently
run in coalitions. The complicating factors are that, in a given election, parties will
run in coalitions in some districts and not in others as well as run in coalitions in one
election year but not the other. In order to simplify the analysis of incumbent party
vote shares, I pool together the vote shares of the PRI and PVEM in all districts and
across all elections. These parties did run in coalition for each election but not across
every district. Similarly, I also treat the PRD, PT, and MC as one coalition in all
cases. These parties ran in coalition in all districts in 2012, but only the PT and MC
ran together in some districts in 2015, and the PRD and PT ran in coalition in some
districts in 2009.
Another issue with the data was matching precincts from one election year to
another. INE periodically combines precincts when they have too few registered
voters and more frequently divides old precincts into several new ones when they
have grown too large in population. To maintain the panel structure of the data I
merged precincts such that they would remain comparable in their boundaries from
one election to another.
3.5 Results
Column 1 of Table 3.1 shows that that there is an overall negative effect on
incumbent party vote share from a precinct being in the border zone in the post-
tax reform (“post treatment”) period. Substantively, there is a drop in incumbent
party vote share by .035 in a dependent variable that can range from 0 to 1, has a
mean of .36 and a standard deviation of .16. Columns (2) and (3) subset the data
by districts where deputies voted for the reform and those in which the deputy did
13http://siceef.ine.mx/atlas.html.
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not, respectively. These results demonstrate that the sanctioning effect observed in
column 1 is driven by districts where the deputy voted for the reform. It is in these
sets of districts where there is a substantively and statistically significant negative
effect on the incumbent party’s vote share from a precinct’s coverage in the border
zone in the post-reform period. Moreover, in the set of districts where deputies did
not vote in favor of the VAT reform, there is a statistically null effect for border zone
precincts in the post-reform period, though the sign of the coefficient is negative. As
the analyses below will demonstrate, that null effect hides substantial variation across
parties in the retrospective behavior of voters in the border areas.
Table 3.1: Taxation and Retrospective Voting
(1) (2) (3)
Overall
Deputy Vote
for Reform
Deputy Did Not
Vote for Reform
Border zone x Post-reform period -0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0587∗∗∗ -0.000909
(0.00224) (0.00386) (0.00313)
2015 Indicator 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0581∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗
(0.000705) (0.00104) (0.00173)
PRI-PVEM incumbent 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0447∗∗∗
(0.00133) (0.00263) (0.00222)
PRD-PT-MC incumbent -0.111∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.0812∗∗∗
(0.00221) (0.00423) (0.00292)
Log(No. of Registered Voters) 0.0436∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗
(0.00770) (0.0105) (0.0112)
Constant 0.227∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.0173) (0.0235) (0.0258)
R-squared 0.169 0.208 0.0950
Number of Precincts 64678 41106 23352
Observations 128174 81410 46324
OLS estimations with precinct fixed effects. The unit of analysis is the precinct year. PAN is
the reference category for district incumbent dummies. Standard errors (clustered at the pre-
cinct level) in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Moving to the question of collective accountability, Table 3.2 shows the analysis
broken down by party, with each model using the full sample. That is, it demonstrates
the results of models with the party/coalition’s share of the vote in the precinct
as the dependent variable regardless of the party’s incumbent status. Thus, it is
meant to summarize the effects of the VAT reform’s incidence on the party’s support
generally.14 The results show that the PAN experienced a positive boost in electoral
support in precincts affected by the tax hike. This is consistent with the expectations
of the collective accountability hypothesis. There is no statistically significant effect
on the vote shares of the PRI-PVEM coalition in affected precincts. To the extent the
party brand had an association with the reform, it was one which was downplayed by
the party in subsequent elections. Interestingly, the PRD and its coalition partners
experienced a general decline in vote share in affected precincts.
Table 3.3 breaks down the analysis by party, but with additional emphasis on
individual deputies’ districts. In these models, the dependent variable is the vote
share of the respective party/coalition for the set of districts where the party/coalition
was the incumbent in 2015. The first takeaway from these results is shown in column
1. The PAN, which had no members voting for the reform, received a boost in
support in the border zone in the post-reform period. A precinct experiencing the
VAT rate increase is associated with a 4.6 percentage point increase in the PAN’s
vote share. The results in columns 2 and 3 also provide strong evidence that the
electoral ramifications for the PRI and PVEM are conditional on the position taken
by the parties’ deputy in the district. The negative effect for the PRI-PVEM vote
share is driven by precincts in districts where the deputy voted for the reform. In
the few districts where PRI and PVEM deputies did not vote in favor, there is a gain
in PRI-PVEM vote share among border areas in the post-reform period, though the
gain in vote share is not as large as that of the PAN.
14In interpreting these results, it is important to note that Mexico’s electoral institutions provide strong
incentive for parties to run candidates in every district, regardless of how unlikely they are to win.
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Table 3.2: Taxation and Party Voting
(1) (2) (3)
PAN share
PRI-PVEM
share
PRD-PT-MC
share
Border zone x Post-reform period 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.00324 -0.0788∗∗∗
(0.00130) (0.00192) (0.00122)
2015 Indicator -0.0543∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.000497) (0.000562) (0.000629)
PRI-PVEM incumbent 0.0151∗∗∗ -0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗
(0.000812) (0.00101) (0.000889)
PRD-PT-MC incumbent 0.00438∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗
(0.00111) (0.00147) (0.00173)
Log(No. of Registered Voters) 0.00749 0.0656∗∗∗ -0.00114
(0.00401) (0.00530) (0.00576)
Constant 0.229∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.0251
(0.00900) (0.0119) (0.0129)
R-squared 0.185 0.0474 0.520
Number of Precincts 64678 64678 64678
Observations 128174 128174 128174
OLS estimations with precinct fixed effects. The unit of analysis is the precinct year.
Standard errors (clustered at the precinct level) in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 3.3: Taxation and Retrospective Voting by Party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PAN
share
PRI-PVEM
share with
deputy
supporting
reform
PRI-PVEM
share with
deputy not
supporting
reform
PRD-PT-MC
share
Border zone x Post-reform period 0.0458∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0152∗ -0.0173∗
(0.00240) (0.00325) (0.00608) (0.00707)
2015 Indicator -0.0676∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0782∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.00104) (0.000803) (0.00287) (0.00155)
Log(No. of Registered Voters) 0.0289∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗∗
(0.00891) (0.00882) (0.0253) (0.0128)
Constant 0.322∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0195) (0.0528) (0.0297)
R-squared 0.288 0.0130 0.211 0.658
Number of Precincts 10806 35302 3201 9345
Observations 21532 69896 6378 18414
OLS estimations with precinct fixed effects. The unit of analysis is the precinct year. Standard
errors (clustered at the precinct level) in parentheses. Each model includes only precincts from
districts where the party is the incumbent SMD seat holder at the 2015 election.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Finally, there is a negative effect for the PRD-PT-MC vote share. Unlike the PAN,
the PRD was divided in how deputies voted for the reform, but the results in column
4 only include districts where the coalition’s deputy did not vote for the reform.15
According to these results, a precinct’s inclusion in the border zone is associated with
a decline in the vote share of the PRD, PT, and MC in the post-reform election.
Analyzing the results for the PRD and its coalition members may be complicated
from the fact that 2015 election is noteworthy for the rise of Morena, a new party
on the scene that was made up of former perredistas, petistas, and members the MC
and replaced the PRD as the largest party on the left.
3.6 Discussion
The results above bear out three important points about legislative voting and
electoral accountability. First, the general pattern in Column 1 of Table 3.1 demon-
strates that voters do punish incumbent parties for the negative effects of policies
produced in the legislature. In this case, voters who bore the cost of an increase to
their VAT rate punish incumbent parties in subsequent elections. Beyond this base-
line, the electoral ramifications of changes in the economic situation of voters is also
dependent on two critical and normatively important distinctions. The results broken
down by party in Table 3.3 along with those in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.1 show
that the positions taken by deputies are consequential for voters’ retrospective behav-
ior. The extent to which voters punish parties for unpopular policies is not simply
a function of how the policy impacts them personally, but also the positions of their
representatives with respect to those policies. This is evident in the different effects
based on whether a precinct is in a district with PRI-PVEM deputies who voted for
the reform and those who did not. The individual positions of deputies and voters’
responses to these actions have important implications for the overall accountability
15It is not possible to estimate a separate regression with a subset of those voting for the reform since there
are no such deputies representing border zone areas, dropping out the parameter of interest entirely.
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of parties in future elections.
The results also point to the importance of party-level dynamics in conditioning
the electoral implications of unpopular roll calls. The party that clearly benefited
electorally from the effects of the reform was the PAN. This is in line with the ex-
pectation that parties that politicize an issue, increasing the connection among the
electorate between the party’s brand and the policy produced by the roll call, and
positioning themselves as the clear alternative can benefit electorally from the unpop-
ular policy. The PAN was the party that was most clear and unified in its opposition
to the reform and subsequently made clear appeals to electorate to reverse the re-
form. As noted earlier, the issue was addressed in the party’s television campaign
advertisements. Moreover, the PAN was the only major party to offer a clear position
on the VAT reform in its 2015 party platform.16 In the list of the party’s proposed
policies is included “promote initiatives that overturn negative aspects of the fiscal re-
form approved by legislators from the PRI, PRD, and PVEM in 2013; among others,
reestablish the different rate of the VAT in the border regions (PAN 2015, 15).” The
case of the PAN in 2015 demonstrates that rhetoric and campaign strategies pursued
by parties are consequential for the electoral sanctioning behavior of voters and the
direction in which their votes swing.
One puzzling finding with respect to theoretical expectations is the results for the
PRD and its coalition members in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. While the effect in Table 3.2,
which shows a negative overall effect for the party throughout the affected regions,
can at least partly be explained by the fact that the party leadership of the PRD
was among the faction working with the Pen˜a Nieto administration to pass reform.
However, the results in Table 3.3 are counter to the theoretical expectations since, as
stated above, that sample in column 4 represents only districts where PRD-PT-MC
deputies voted against the reform. Therefore, any considerations about the individual
16The PVEM and Morena both mention the VAT but neither offers any potential changes to the tax.
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positions taken by PRD-PT-MC deputies is overrun by the general negative effect on
the party. There are multiple factors that should make one cautious about placing
great weight on the comparisons and findings for the PRD-PT-MC. Foremost of these
is the ascendance of Morena as an offshoot of the party and its subsequent siphoning
of the PRD’s base of partisans and elected officials is likely to distort the relationships
observed for the PRD.
3.7 Robustness
The key identification assumption of the difference-in-difference design is that a
precinct that experiences a change in VAT rate should maintain the same difference
(in support for the incumbent party) to an unaffected control precinct had it not
experienced the VAT hike. While it is impossible to observe if this would have been
the case (since we are only able to observe the world where border zones experience
a VAT increase), I am able to draw on available data to test whether affected and
unaffected precincts had previously followed common trends prior to the policy in-
tervention. Since I am working with electoral data, there is a readily available panel
of observations from regular intervals from which to draw. Specifically, I perform a
placebo test that mirrors the analysis in Table 3.1 but instead uses observations from
the 2012 and 2009 elections. Rather than a dummy for post-reform election year and
its interaction with the percent of the precinct covered by the border zone, I substitute
a dummy for the 2009 election year and its dummy with border zone variable. To the
extent that the coefficient on the interaction variable is null, then this would suggest
that the border zone precincts and the rest of the country followed common trends
prior to the intervention. Table 3.4 shows the results of this model. The coefficient
on the variable of interest is positively signed and not statistically significant. This
finding increases confidence in the causal relationship between VAT rate changes and
voter behavior.
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Table 3.4: Taxation and Retrospective Voting Placebo Test
(1)
Border zone x Pre-reform period 0.00115
(0.00207)
2009 Indicator 0.122∗∗∗
(0.000937)
PRI-PVEM incumbent 0.168∗∗∗
(0.00151)
PRD-PT-MC incumbent -0.0457∗∗∗
(0.00204)
Log(No. of Registered Voters) 0.0402∗∗∗
(0.00632)
Constant 0.149∗∗∗
(0.0142)
R-squared 0.275
Number of Precincts 64736
Observations 129307
OLS estimations with precinct fixed effects. The unit of analysis is the precinct year.
PAN is the reference category for district incumbent dummies. Standard errors
(clustered at the precinct level) in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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To further test the robustness of the relationship between VAT rate policy and
election outcomes, I include an analysis that controls for possible effects from crime.
In the context of the nation’s persistent problems of insecurity, recent scholarship
has connected insecurity to citizens’ electoral behavior (Bateson 2012, Trelles and
Carreras 2012, Ley 2017). Importantly for this study, insecurity is a time-varying
variable and may confound the results here if the change in the rate of crime is
substantially different in the border regions. Table 3.5 demonstrates that the main
results are robust to the inclusion of a variable measuring the municipal-level homicide
rate for the year leading up to the election (per 1,000 persons). Interestingly, the effect
of the homicide rate according to the results is positive for the incumbent party,
although the effect is substantively small and not statistically significant. Franco
Vivanco et al. (2015), who also utilize precinct-level results, examine the effect of
insecurity on the presidential vote in the 2012 Mexican elections. They find that there
is not necessarily an incumbent-based sanctioning but more so sanctioning against
the PRI, which may explain the result here. Nevertheless, the result of the VAT rate
effect is robust.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that legislators roll calls votes are electorally conse-
quential. Voters do what democracy tasks them with and hold parties accountable for
the actions of representatives. Specifically, they sanction incumbent parties when rep-
resentatives’ roll calls result in negative shocks to their material well-being. However,
there is not merely simple retrospection. Representatives and parties can influence the
extent and direction of their constituents’ retrospective votes based on their positions
at the time of the roll call as well as in their responses to unpopular roll calls.
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Table 3.5: Controlling for Municipal-Level Insecurity
(1)
Border zone x Post-reform period -0.0327∗∗∗
(0.00245)
2015 Indicator 0.0516∗∗∗
(0.000858)
PRI-PVEM incumbent 0.0477∗∗∗
(0.00160)
PRD-PT-MC incumbent -0.103∗∗∗
(0.00259)
Log(No. of Registered Voters) 0.0493∗∗∗
(0.00779)
Homicide rate (per 1,000 persons) 0.00398
(0.00246)
Constant 0.212∗∗∗
(0.0176)
R-squared 0.153
Number of Precincts 62518
Observations 119609
OLS estimations with precinct fixed effects. The unit of analysis is the precinct year.
PAN is the reference category for district incumbent dummies. Standard errors
(clustered at the precinct level) in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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3.9 Appendix
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Figure 3.1: Northern Border Zone
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Figure 3.2: Southern Border Zone
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Chapter 4
Female Officeholders and Women’s Political Engagement: The Role of Parties
4.1 Introduction
Can female officeholders inspire other women to enter politics? The potential for
women in office to serve as a catalyst for the political engagement of other women
is important considering the gender gap in political representation that characterizes
politics across the world. Previous research on this process, commonly referred to as
a role model effect, finds mixed results across a diverse set of contexts. This paper
makes two contributions. First, I propose that researchers take into account the larger
candidate emergence process when testing for role model effects, rather than focusing
on the final stage of candidacies. Second, I argue that political parties, especially in
their choices over candidate selection methods, can exert considerable influence in the
gender composition of candidates and thus influence the potential for observing role
model effects at the candidate level.
This paper is organized into two parts. First, I provide a rationale for taking a
larger view of candidate emergence when testing for role model effects. Using the case
of Mexican legislative elections, I find no evidence for role model effects at the level
of candidacies, but I do find evidence for role model effects from female officeholders
at earlier stages of the candidate emergence process (among the mass public and
aspirants for parties’ nominations). In the second part of the paper, I develop a
theoretical justification for how the gendered consequences of candidate selection
methods interact with parties’ strategic considerations about which methods to use,
resulting in party influence that can attenuate any role model effects. Again, using
data from Mexican parties, I show that parties’ choices at this stage can wash out
any effects of female officeholders on female aspirants for office. These findings have
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important implications for future research on role model effects.
4.2 Women’s Representation and Role Model Effects
A key dimension of political representation is the extent to which a governing body
resembles or mirrors the citizens it is tasked with representing (Pitkin 1967). This con-
cept of descriptive representation is particularly important for legislative institutions,
which serve as the primary representative body of government. Yet, a widespread
feature of legislatures across the world is the under-representation of women in office.
These deficits in descriptive representation are argued to have significant implications
for the substantive representation of women (Phillips 1995, Mansbridge 1999). More-
over, unequal representation in deliberative bodies along gender lines is associated
with diminished legitimacy for the institution (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005) as
well as for its policy decisions (Clayton et al. 2019).
Given the importance of descriptive representation for a political system, re-
searchers have focused on the factors that impede (or improve) the numerical repre-
sentation of women in government. Research in the U.S. and U.K. contexts finds that
women fair as well as men in comparable elections (Norris et al. 1992, Seltzer et al.
1997). However, a negative bias for female candidates among voters has been found in
other contexts (Schwindt-Bayer et al. 2010, Langston and Aparicio 2011), especially
in systems with electoral rules that facilitate such biases in voting behavior (Batista
Pereira 2015). Nevertheless, the disparities in whether men and women run for office
are an important contributor to the overall inequalities in descriptive representation
across the world. Scholars have thus focused their attention to the question of female
candidacy for office, as the lower frequency of women running for office is found to
be a driver of women’s under-representation among officeholders (Lawless and Fox
2010).
This focus on the disparities in candidacies has been paralleled by developments
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in the policy-making sphere towards the implementation of gender quotas for parties’
lists of candidates. These quotas are meant to fast-track the process of opening the
political sphere to traditionally excluded groups (Tripp and Kang 2008). They do so
by correcting for the strongest determinant of whether a member of such groups (in
this case women) wins office: whether they run for office. The expansion of women in
office that has been brought about by such policies, as well as in non-quota systems,
has raised the question of their potential symbolic effects. The concept of symbolic
representation refers to the emotional or affective response for constituents from the
descriptive characteristics of the representative (Pitkin 1967, 100). A woman winning
political office is theorized to influence the political engagement (specifically, the
office-seeking behavior) of other women through these symbolic effects as well as other
practical means such as influencing candidate recruitment. This has great normative
implications as the potential for symbolic effects on women’s political attitudes and
engagement entails a virtuous cycle of women winning political office in unequal
contexts. A sizable body of research has developed around the empirical testing of
such symbolic effects from female politicians.
Previous work has identified significant gaps in political ambition and engagement
between men and women in their early lives that result in gender gaps in the composi-
tion of those who run for office (Dolan et al. 2007, Fox and Lawless 2014). Therefore,
much attention has been placed on the effects of female officeholders on the political
engagement of their constituents and especially among adolescents. On this front,
studies find a positive link between the presence of female politicians and the politi-
cal interest of women, including adolescents (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). There
is comparative research in support of the hypothesis that female officeholders influ-
ence women’s political participation (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007, Desposato and
Norrander 2009). However, there are also mixed or null results (Lawless 2004, Dolan
2006) as well as arguments in favor of conditional effects based on party congruence
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between politician and citizen (Reingold and Harrell 2010) as well as the political
competitiveness of seats (Atkeson 2003). Moreover there are questions about the
generalizability of these effects for all regions of the world (Liu 2018). Evidence of
backlash effects (worsening political engagement from female politicians) is found in
contexts where strong quotas may generate negative stigmas for female politicians
(Clayton 2015, Kerevel and Atkeson 2017).
The logic of symbolic benefits can apply to the level of office-seeking, a particularly
intense form of political engagement. Along with the symbolic mechanism, female
officeholders may be in a position to improve the political recruitment of women.
Despite the theorized relationship, previous research on the role model effect of female
officeholders on other women’s decision to run for office finds mixed results. Moreover,
these mixed results come from a variety of political contexts. Studies from a unique
policy experiment in India that randomized assignment of gender quotas find evidence
for persistent positive effects on the likelihood that women stand for and win public
office in constituencies with female officeholders (Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani
2009). However, in a study of Indian state legislatures, Bhalotra et al. (2018) find
that positive effects in subsequent elections are driven by female incumbents and
there is in fact a reduction in the entry of new female candidates. In a different
context, Broockman (2014) finds no positive effects from women winning nearby state
legislative seats on women’s political engagement (measured as turnout and running
for office). Moreover, any positive effect in the number of women candidates and
probability of women winning office in subsequent elections seems driven solely by
female incumbents. In a study of Swiss local elections Gilardi (2015) finds that the
presence of female officeholders is positively associated with the number of women
who subsequently run for office in neighboring districts. This effect is especially strong
in the period following women’s political enfranchisement and diminishes over time.
Authors have attempted to provide system-level explanations for these mixed
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Figure 4.1: Role Model Effects and Candidate Emergence
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results. One potential explanation is that positive effects are conditional on the level
of women’s incorporation into the political life of a given context. Gilardi’s (2015)
work grapples directly with this question by suggesting that the symbolic importance
of a female officeholder is particularly pronounced at early stages of women’s political
inclusion and becomes negligible once some sufficient level of political inclusion is
achieved. This may explain why no effects are found in the US context. However, the
contrasting findings from the same context of India (Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani
2009; Bhalotra et al. 2018), where the societal-level political inclusion of women is
low, cast doubt on this potential explanation. Another potential explanation is that
female incumbents can lower the perceived need/utility of more women running, or
perhaps deter female newcomers. As the analysis of the Mexican case will highlight
below, this incumbency explanation may also be insufficient.
This paper makes a theoretical contribution to the study of role model effects by
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placing a spotlight on the role of parties. Previous work that has found no support
for role model effects at the level of candidacies fails to account for the many stages of
the candidate emergence process. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the stages of the candidate
emergence process and how role model effects from female officeholders are theorized
to take hold. At the start, there is a female officeholder who wins office in the pre-
vious period. This would result in increases in the political engagement of women
in the general population. At the next stage, women activated by the role model
effect become more likely to seek the nomination of parties for elected office. Sub-
sequently, parties make selections based on the pool of aspirants (or pre-candidates)
for the general election. Between the aspirant and candidate stage, parties exercise a
tremendous amount of influence in their ability to shape the composition of nominees
for public office. Finally, a greater share of women candidates is expected to lead to
more women officeholders.1
There are three important takeaways from the process illustrated by this figure.
First, candidate emergence entails multiple stages, any of which can serve as a bottle-
neck for female newcomers. Second, this has implications for the ability of researchers
to observe role model effects, which begin at an earlier stage of the pipeline and may
eventually lead to candidacies. If studies operationalize the presence of role model
effects from female officeholders in terms of changes in the composition of candidates,
this may ignore changes in political engagement earlier in the process. Third, parties
can exercise a substantial amount of influence between the aspirant and candidate
stages, particularly in their candidate selection methods, that may serve as a potential
bottleneck for any role model effects.
The process outlined in Figure 4.1 also underscores the other main contribution
of this paper for the empirical study of role model effects. Lawless and Fox (2010)
1As Lawless and Fox (2010) argue, the deficit in women’s representation is due in larger part to deficits
in the number of women candidates than deficits in electoral performance compared to men. Langston and
Aparicio (2011) find similar patterns in the case of Mexican legislative elections, the focus of this paper.
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analyzed gender dynamics at different stages of the candidate emergence process to
identify the decision to run as the most important factor in women’s underrepresen-
tation in the United States. I adapt this framework for testing for and understanding
role model effects. I propose future research eschew making conclusions about the
strength and nature of role model effects from a test at a single stage (and especially
at the final stages of the process as in the previous work on female candidacies cited
above). Instead, I argue that researchers should take into account tests of the rela-
tionship between female officeholders and women’s political engagement throughout
the process of candidate emergence. This approach has three advantages. First, it
provides a more comprehensive assessment of role model effects in a given politi-
cal system. A narrow empirical null result at the level of candidacies may lead to
the erroneous conclusion that female officeholders do not provide an inspiration for
women to enter politics when there is such a relationship at earlier stages. Second,
this approach can aide researchers in identifying the factors that may attenuate po-
tential role model effects (as this paper will demonstrate with candidate selection
methods and the Mexican case). Finally, a comprehensive approach will encourage
the integration of the large body of research on symbolic representation and mass
behavior and attitudes (referenced above) with research on political ambition and
nomination-seeking.
In the following section, I test for role model effects from female officeholders at
different stages of the candidate emergence process in Mexican legislative elections.
First, I find no evidence of role model effects at the level of candidacies. However,
unlike previous research, I do not conclude that there is no overall effect, but instead
examine earlier stages of the candidate emergence process. This leads to my second
set of empirical results. I demonstrate that there is evidence for role model effects at
the level of the mass public and (focusing on one of the major parties) at the stage
of pre-candidacies (those who are seeking a party’s nomination for office).
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4.3 Observing Role Model Effects in Mexican Legislative Elections
To demonstrate the importance of political parties for role model effects, I focus
on the case of Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies. This is a particularly useful and critical
case for examining role model effects for three reasons. First, strict term limits mean
that at each legislative election there are no incumbents running for the same seat.
Previous studies examining the causal effect of female officeholders on the future
electoral prospects of women in a district have been unable to disentangle the effects
of office holding and personal incumbency advantage (Bhavnani, 2009; Broockman,
2014), or indicate the effects are solely driven by incumbency with a negative effect
on newcomers (Bhalotra et al. 2018). Since Mexican deputies were constitutionally
barred from seeking immediate reelection in the period under study, any observed
effect of a woman winning office at time t-1 on the likelihood of women running in
the district at time t can be attributed solely to female office holding and not personal
incumbency advantage. Moreover, term limits also serve to remove an institutional
barrier to the proliferation of female candidates and officeholders (Schwindt-Bayer
2005). Without the impediment of an incumbent running for reelection, women
inspired to run for office should face one less institutional barrier. Second, over
the previous two decades, Mexico has adopted increasingly strict gender quotas for
legislative candidacies (Baldez 2004). This creates conditions where it may be in
the interest of parties to facilitate role model effects (with engagement beginning
in the mass public and extending to the candidate level). Third, despite the rapid
expansion of women’s numerical representation in the federal legislature, they remain
significantly underrepresented in local and executive posts. Therefore, there is little
evidence that Mexican society has achieved a necessary level of women’s political
inclusion such that one would not expect role model effects. For these reasons, Mexico
is a case where one should expect to observe role model effects. And to the extent
that there are no such observable effects, it is incumbent on researchers to understand
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why this would not be the case in an otherwise accommodating test of the theory.
I first test for potential role model effects at the level of candidacies in legislative
elections. The dependent variable is the share of female candidates in a district.2 The
main independent variables of interest are an indicator for whether a woman won in
the district at election t-1 and the share of female winners in neighboring electoral
districts at election t-1. Districts are neighbors if they share a border. Therefore if
a district is bordered by five other districts, I take the the total number of women
candidates in those five districts and divide that number by the total number of all
candidates in those five districts in the previous election. This second variable is
meant to capture any potential spatial effects, which have been the focus of much of
the previous work in role model effects on office-seeking behavior (Broockman 2014;
Gilardi 2015). Together these variables are meant to test for any role model effects
both within and across districts (via spatial diffusion). The data consists largely of
electoral returns and candidate lists made available by the National Electoral Institute
(INE) of Mexico. I use data from the 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 congressional
elections since these featured the same single-member electoral district boundaries.
Using the candidate lists provided by INE, I coded the gender for each of the 7,482
candidates in these four elections based on their name. Since there are 300 single
member districts, the total number of district races at time t that can be influenced
by an election at time t-1 is 900.
I utilize two widely used estimation methods for time-series cross-sectional data:
a district fixed effects model, and Beck and Katz’s (1995) OLS with panel-corrected
standard errors. I also control for the partisan affiliation of the district winner at the
previous election (PAN as the reference category) and election year dummies. These
election year dummies are particularly important in controlling for the effect of gender
2It should be noted that given Mexico’s mixed electoral system, which distributes votes in the proportional
representation (PR) tier based on votes in the single member districts (SMDs), parties and coalitions have an
incentive to and do field candidates in every congressional district so as to maximize the number of votes for
the larger PR tier districts.
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Table 4.1: Models of the Percent of Female Candidates in a District (2009-2015)
(1) (2) (3)
% Women % Women % Women
% Women (t-1) 0.176 0.109
(0.269) (0.282)
% Women among Neighbor Winners (t-1) 0.0750 -0.0129 0.0141
(0.0549) (0.0268) (0.0387)
Woman District Winner (t-1) -1.480 -1.524 -7.892∗∗∗
(1.626) (1.641) (1.811)
PRD and Left 1.221 -0.265 1.990
(1.808) (1.615) (2.938)
PRI-PVEM 5.832∗ 0.766 3.043
(2.663) (1.116) (2.109)
year=2012 10.12∗∗∗ 9.801∗∗∗
(0.532) (1.653)
year=2015 17.65∗∗∗ 18.82∗∗∗
(3.328) (1.713)
Constant 30.44∗∗ 28.07∗∗∗ 30.66∗∗∗
(9.317) (8.166) (1.741)
Observations 900 900 900
R2 0.052 0.143 0.240
For models (1) and (2), Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel corrected standard
errors in parentheses. For model (3), district dummies are not reported.
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quotas that were strengthened between each election. Table 4.1 reports the results of
these different models. In no case is there a significant positive effect from a female
officeholder on the percent of candidates who are women in the next election. In the
fixed effects model, the coefficient for having a woman win in the previous election is
in fact negative and statistically significant, but the statistical significance does not
appear robust across models. The sign on the coefficient for the spatial role model
effect also flips across models. It is clear from these results that there is at least no
statistically positive effect from female officeholders (either within districts or from
neighboring districts) on the share of female candidates in a district.3
While I do not observe a role model effect at the level of candidacies, this does
not mean there is no effect from female officeholders operating at other stages of the
candidate emergence process. I now test for role model effects at the level of the mass
public. To do so, I use survey data from the 2012 Mexico Panel Study which surveyed
respondents prior to and after the 2012 federal elections.4 The dependent variable of
interest here is post-election interest in politics as measured from a survey item asking
“How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, a little, or none?” Responses
are coded to range from 0 (none) to 1 (a lot). The main independent variable is an
indicator for whether a woman won in the district in the 2012 legislative elections. The
panel structure of the data allows me to control for pre-election interest in politics as
well as a series of demographic variables as well as the respondent’s pre-election vote
choice (with not voting as the reference category). To examine the gender-specific
impact theorized by the role model effects literature, I estimate separate models for
men and women.5
3Count models with the number of female candidates (rather than the share) as the dependent variable and
controlling for the total number of candidates produce similar results.
4Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2012 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Jorge
Domı´nguez, Kenneth Greene, Chappell Lawson, and Alejandro Moreno. Funding for the study was pro-
vided by the Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinio´n Pu´blica de la Ca´mara de Diputados (CESOP) and the
Secretarı´a de Gobernacio´n; fieldwork was conducted by DATA OPM, under the direction of Pablo Para´s.
5An alternative strategy would be to pool both men and women together and include an interaction term
between gender and the indicator for a woman winning in the district. I opt for sub-setting the data in this
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Figure 4.2: Models of Post-Election Political Engagement by Gender
Woman district winner
JVM vote intention (t-1)
EPN vote intention (t-1)
AMLO vote intention (t-1)
Age 31 - 50
Age 51+
Secondary Ed.
Preparatory Ed.
University
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Women
Woman district winner
JVM vote intention (t-1)
EPN vote intention (t-1)
AMLO vote intention (t-1)
Age 31 - 50
Age 51+
Secondary Ed.
Preparatory Ed.
University
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Men
Source: Mexico Panel Study, 2012. Notes: Points represent coefficients for models of post-
election political interest. Solid lines indicate 95% confidence interval.
Each model controls for lagged political interest (coefficient not plotted).
The results of these models of post-election political engagement presented in Fig-
ure 4.2 demonstrate that there is a positive and statistically significant role model
effect.6 Having a woman win the legislative district has a positive effect on the self-
reported political interest of Mexican women, controlling for pre-election political
interest, demographic variables, and pre-election political preferences. There is no
such effect in the model of post-election political engagement of Mexican men. This
provides evidence that female officeholders do have a positive effect on the political
engagement of women at the earliest stage of the candidate emergence process (po-
litical activation among the mass public). Do these role model effects carry on to
the next stage of the process, when women seek the nomination of parties for elected
office? I address this question in the following section.
way, which is equivalent to a fully interacted model.
6Table 4.3 in the appendix summarizes the estimates and fit statistics for these models.
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Studying the dynamics of candidate emergence at the level of pre-candidacies,
when aspirants for office seek the nomination of parties, is made difficult in the com-
parative context by the tendency of parties to obscure what can be very contentious
intra-party contests, prompting scholars to refer to this as ‘the black box’ (Kenny
and Verge 2016). In this section, I focus on the aspirants for office of one party,
the Partido Accio´n Nacional (PAN), in the lead-up to the 2015 federal elections.
From party documents, I collected data about the method of selection and the list of
pre-candidates for each of the single member districts.7 As with the candidate-level
analyses, I coded the number of women and the number of men for each district
where the PAN held a primary to select candidates.8 These counts for each district
serve as the dependent variables for the aspirant-level analyses below. Mirroring the
candidate-level analyses, the independent variables of interest are an indicator for
whether a woman won in the district at election t-1 and the share of female winners
in neighboring electoral districts at election t-1. To the extent that there are role
model effects on the likelihood that a woman seeks a party’s nomination, I expect
to find positive effects for these variables. I also control for the electoral value of
the district by including an indicator for whether the district is a safe PAN seat. A
district is categorized as being a safe PAN seat in 2015 if the party won the seat in
the 2006, 2009, and 2012 elections.
I estimate two poisson regression models. One for the count of female pre-
candidates in a district and another for the count of male pre-candidates. Table
4.2 summarizes the results of these models.9 The first column demonstrates that
there is evidence for role model effects at the level of aspirants for office. Having a
7Documents from the party’s Electoral Organizing Committee are available at
http://www.pan.org.mx/estrados-electronicos-coe-archivo/.
8I do not have data on districts where the party simply designated a candidate, since there is no self-
nomination by pre-candidates in those cases.
9The reason the two models have a differing number of observations is because the PAN reserved some
primaries for only female pre-candidates in 2015. The results here are robust to including an indicator for
this reserved primary system in the model for the number of female pre-candidates.
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Table 4.2: Poisson Model of Number of Pre-Candidates in a District
(1) (2)
No. of Women No. of Men
Woman District Winner 2012 0.489∗∗ 0.0886
(0.169) (0.164)
% Women among Neighbor Winners 2012 0.634 0.252
(0.348) (0.300)
Safe PAN District 0.560∗ 0.471∗
(0.280) (0.215)
Constant -0.740∗∗∗ 0.230
(0.161) (0.131)
Observations 224 142
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001
woman win the district in the previous election as well as an increase in the share
of women who won in neighboring districts leads to a higher count in the number
of female pre-candidates. This association is statistically significant for the former
and marginally so for the latter. As expected, there is no such effect for the number
of male pre-candidates. Safe districts draw a higher number of aspirants for office
among both genders.
To provide an interpretation of the substantive significance of these effects, Figure
4.3 plots the predicted number of pre-candidates as a function of whether a woman
won the district previously. There are two takeaways from this graph. First, the role
model effect among women is substantively meaningful. A district where a woman
won previously has an expected pre-candidate count of .94 compared to a predicted
count of .57 for a district with a male winner in the last election.10 For reference, the
average number of women pre-candidates in a district is around .7. Second, the figure
10Holding the share of neighboring women winners (t-1) at its mean value and the safe PAN indicator at
its mode of zero.
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Figure 4.3: Role Model Effects on Aspirants for PAN Nomination
.4
.6
.8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
P
re
di
ct
ed
 N
o.
 o
f P
re
ca
nd
id
at
es
0 1
Woman won district (t-1)
Women
.4
.6
.8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
P
re
di
ct
ed
 N
o.
 o
f P
re
ca
nd
id
at
es
0 1
Woman won district (t-1)
Men
demonstrates a persistent gap in political ambition between men and women, even
when considering the role model effect. This is in line with previous work showing that
gaps in women’s descriptive representation begin with gaps in ambition for seeking
office (Lawless and Fox 2010). This also underscores the importance of role model
effects for chipping away at this gap in political ambition.
The preceding series of empirical results demonstrate that null findings at the
candidate level do not preclude overall role model effects in a political system. Using
the case of Mexico, I demonstrated that role model effects are observable at earlier
stages of the candidate emergence process (in the mass public, and among aspirants
for party nominations). As Figure 4.1 at the start of the paper illustrates, I argue
that political parties, in their influence over the candidate selection process, play an
important role in whether role model effects are observable at the final and crucial
stages of the candidate emergence process (when citizens stand for public office in a
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general election). In the second part of this paper, I draw on the literature on parties
and develop an explanation for why candidate selection methods play an important
role in obscuring the presence of role model effects in Mexican legislative elections.
Using data on the PAN’s 2015 selection methods, I find support for this explanation.
4.4 Candidate Selection Methods
To develop an explanation for the mixed results in the behavioral literature on role
model effects, I draw on the institutional research on the effects of political parties
on women’s descriptive representation. Scholars have looked to a variety of party
characteristics that can directly influence the gender composition of their candidacies
(Caul 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005), such as party ideology (Funk et al. 2017),
candidate quota adoption (Caul 2001), candidate recruitment (Sanbonmatsu 2002),
and the bureaucratization of candidate selection (Bjarneg˚ard and Zetterberg 2016).
I focus here on candidate selection methods, since they are the most visible means
by which parties exert influence in the composition of nominees for office. As Kenny
and Verge (2016) note, candidate selection is central to the question of how political
parties facilitate or block women’s access to political office.
Research in this area has demonstrated that there are gendered consequences from
parties’ candidate selection procedures. In Latin America, Hinojosa (2012) shows that
certain selection methods are better suited for producing women candidates than oth-
ers. Specifically, selection methods that are exclusive and centralized by the party
leadership are more likely to produce female nominees than inclusive and decentral-
ized selection methods. In practice, an exclusive-centralized method often takes the
form of a central party committee designating candidacies nationally. An inclusive-
decentralized method often entails a primary held at the level of the electoral unit for
the general election. The reason for the gendered outcomes of these methods, Hino-
josa argues (2012, 44-52), is that exclusive and centralized methods avoid the problem
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of self-nomination and neutralize power monopolies. Traditional power monopolies
tend to favor political insiders and therefore exclude many women. The problem of
self-nomination refers to the underlying gap in the likelihood of seeking elected office
between men and women. These obstacles for female aspirants are present in open
and decentralized selection methods such as primaries.
Additionally, these selection methods are not decided at random by parties. Lead-
ership must take into account their own desire to select candidates suited for the elec-
toral and political environment of the general election as well as party members’ and
activists’ desire to exercise local influence over candidacies. Previous work has found
that the major Mexican parties make strategic choices about their candidate selection
methods in response to the electoral environment (Langston 2006; Wuhs 2006, 2008).
Research on the PAN, the party on which the aspirant-level analyses focused, finds
that the party’s membership has traditionally favored decentralized primaries with
voting open only to party members and activists. This has resulted in patterns where
the party tends to favor using closed primaries in its strongest areas with the greatest
concentration of members and activists (Bruhn and Wuhs 2016). A similar pattern
holds for the PRD, the main leftist party up until the 2015 elections. The PRI has
also favored more decentralized methods, such as state-level conventions or allowing
governors to choose candidates, in more competitive areas (Langston 2006).
Crucial for this paper’s focus on the role of parties in facilitating or attenuating
the political engagement effects from female officeholders is how parties’ strategic con-
siderations interact with the gendered consequences of selection methods addressed
above. If the type of selection method that parties employ in their strongest districts
tends to be more open and decentralized, then these are precisely the types of meth-
ods that disfavor the emergence of female candidates. The selection method choices
of the party can then greatly reshape of the composition of candidates for office from
the original pool of aspirants for the party’s nomination.
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To illustrate this dynamic, I focus on the candidate selection methods of the PAN
in 2015. The party used four different methods for selecting candidates across the 300
SMDs: Closed primaries (election by members), designation, closed primaries reserved
for female pre-candidates, and open primaries.11 The share of women nominees to
come out of each selection method was 18%, 60.5%, 94%, and 50% respectively.12 This
pattern is in line with previous work showing that designation is more conducive for
female candidates compared to primaries. Although women seem to perform better
than prior research would expect in open primaries, this selection method was only
used in 4 districts in 2015, so one should be cautious to conclude that PANista women
fare well in open legislative primaries.
Having established that the PAN’s candidate selection methods had clear con-
sequences for the likely gender of the nominee, such that traditional (non-reserved)
primaries disfavor women and designation favors women, I now show how this maps
onto electoral competition resulting in a disruption of role model effects. Figure 4.4
presents the predicted probabilities from a multinomial logit model of the candidate
selection method used by the PAN in 2015, as a function of the party’s share of the
district vote in the previous election.13 This is the sole predictor in the model. This
figure shows that in districts where the PAN fared best in 2012, the party is more
likely to utilize selection methods that disfavor women (such as closed primaries).
Conversely, the party is much more likely to use selection methods that favor women
in districts where the party has performed very poorly in the past (such as desig-
nation).14 The relationship between the use of reserved primaries (which was a new
11The breakdown of how frequently each method was used across the 300 single member districts is as
follows: Closed primary - 138, designation - 76, woman-reserved primary - 82, open primary - 4.
12The reason the share is only 94% percent for primaries reserved for women is that in cases when no
pre-candidate emerges in a primary the party simply designates a candidate, which can be man. In both the
reserved and non-reserved primaries, there are instances when no pre-candidate emerges in districts where
the party is nearly guaranteed to lose.
13Table 4.5 summarizes the estimates for the model used to plot Figure 4.4.
14Figure 4.5 in the appendix plots the distribution of the PAN’s electoral performance in 2012 across the
single member districts. One should note that given Mexico’s multiparty system, parties rarely receive more
than 50% of a district’s votes. The first-place party in a district typically wins with a plurality considerably
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Figure 4.4: PAN Electoral Performance in 2012 and Party Selection Method in 2015
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method employed in 2015) and previous PAN share is flatter than the associations
between closed primaries/designation and PAN vote share. Moreover, as the aspirant-
level analyses in the previous section demonstrated, both men and women are much
more likely to seek out nominations in areas where the party performs well rather
than serve as sacrificial lambs. These empirical patterns taken together, the gendered
effects of selection methods and the party’s preference to utilize methods disfavoring
women in its most valuable districts, result in a substantial dampening of any role
model effects immediately prior to the candidate stage. While women may have been
activated by the inspiration of a female officeholder at earlier stages of the candidate
emergence process (as I found above), parties’ choices about selection methods serve
as a significant bottleneck and wash out any such pattern at the candidate level. Ul-
timately, these choices by party leadership serve to obfuscate patterns in the political
below the 50% mark.
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behavior of women in the party’s grassroots.
4.5 Discussion
This paper has demonstrated that in order to provide a full assessment of the
presence of role model effects in a political system, researchers should examine the
larger candidate emergence process. Mixed results in tests for role model effects
from female officeholders should avoid a narrow focus on the candidate level for two
reasons. First, this may lead to the erroneous conclusion that female officeholders do
not provide an inspiration for women to enter politics in a given political system. It
may simply mean that this effect is not observable at the final stage of candidacies in
the pipeline starting from the general population and ending with party nominees for
office. Second, a broader examination of the candidate emergence process may help
researchers pinpoint where in the different stages of candidate emergence is there no
evidence for role model effects. This can help identify reasons for why a role model
effect is attenuated in a given context. This point leads to the second contribution
of the paper, which is to place a spotlight on parties and how they may facilitate or
attenuate role model effects. As I have argued and shown using the case of Mexico and
the PAN, party decisions, especially with respect to candidate selection, can greatly
influence the makeup of candidates for office. This has the potential of obscuring
any role model effects. Researchers who find null results (or positive results for that
matter) should consider the potential influence of parties in creating the conditions
for or against role model effects from female officeholders.
4.6 Appendix
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Table 4.3: OLS Models of Post-Election Political Interest
(1) (2)
Women Men
Political Interest (t-1) 0.275∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.0462) (0.0477)
Woman district winner 0.0692∗ 0.00373
(0.0271) (0.0308)
JVM vote intention (t-1) 0.0570 0.0307
(0.0385) (0.0422)
EPN vote intention (t-1) 0.0973∗∗ 0.0467
(0.0361) (0.0387)
AMLO vote intention (t-1) 0.104∗∗ 0.00189
(0.0395) (0.0421)
Age 31 - 50 -0.0126 0.0325
(0.0300) (0.0345)
Age 51+ -0.0492 -0.00209
(0.0407) (0.0400)
Secondary Ed. 0.0288 -0.0144
(0.0323) (0.0406)
Preparatory Ed. 0.0747 0.0210
(0.0382) (0.0485)
University 0.0680 0.0319
(0.0475) (0.0447)
Constant 0.196∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.0436) (0.0527)
Observations 495 388
R2 0.138 0.102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for 2012 Panel Data of Mass Public
mean sd min max count
Political Interest 0.43 0.30 0 1 889
Political Interest (t-1) 0.44 0.32 0 1 1281
Woman district winner 0.30 0.46 0 1 1288
JVM vote intention (t-1) 0.21 0.41 0 1 1288
EPN vote intention (t-1) 0.32 0.47 0 1 1288
AMLO vote intention (t-1) 0.22 0.41 0 1 1288
age group==Age 30 and under 0.33 0.47 0 1 1288
age group==Age 31 - 50 0.42 0.49 0 1 1288
age group==Age 51+ 0.24 0.43 0 1 1288
edr==None or Primary Ed. 0.32 0.47 0 1 1287
edr==Secondary Ed. 0.31 0.46 0 1 1287
edr==Preparatory Ed. 0.21 0.40 0 1 1287
edr==University 0.16 0.37 0 1 1287
Woman 0.52 0.50 0 1 1288
Table 4.5: Multinomial Logit of PAN Selection Method in 2012
method
Designation
PAN Share 2012 -6.643∗
(2.798)
Constant 1.107
(0.711)
Woman Reserved Primary
PAN Share 2012 -1.764
(1.287)
Constant -0.0184
(0.443)
Open Primary
PAN Share 2012 3.962∗
(1.920)
Constant -4.801∗∗∗
(1.103)
Observations 300
Standard errors in parentheses
Closed Primary is the reference category.
∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of PAN Performance in 2012
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